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Executive Summary 
In Europe a trend towards higher taxation of alcoholic beverages can recently be observed. Whether it is 
possible to raise additional tax revenues from the taxation of alcoholic beverages and/or reducing excessive 
consumption crucially depends on the functioning of the market for alcoholic beverages. A circumstance 
which deserves attention is that alcoholic beverage types are taxed very differently and, in most cases, 
spirits drinks are much higher taxed than beer or wine. 
The aim of this study is to gather empirical evidence of the impacts of excise tax changes for alcoholic 
beverages on market volumes and excise and value added tax revenues for the three countries Spain, 
France and Poland. Methodologically this is done by estimating the main parameters – the tax pass-through 
rate of excise duties to consumer prices and the price elasticities of demand for alcoholic beverages – via 
state-of-the-art econometric approaches based on rich datasets covering micro data of consumption at 
household levels, macroeconomic sales, volume and excise tax data for a panel of European countries and 
collected excise tax revenues for alcoholic beverages and VAT revenues. These parameters, along with 
other macroeconomic variables that influence market volume trends in the three countries, are used to 
predict a benchmark development path for market volumes and tax revenues for each alcoholic beverage in 
each country. We then developed a user-friendly tax reform simulation spreadsheet tool that can easily be 
employed for customized scenario analysis. The tool is capable of simulation two simultaneous scenarios in 
addition to the benchmark and outputs the impacts of the inputted excise tax changes on market volumes 
and tax revenues.  
The main findings of the study are: 
 The literature survey finds very diverse estimates for price elasticities of alcoholic beverages. 
 We find evidence that excise taxes are typically fully passed onto consumer prices. 
 Using micro data at the household level, we find price elasticities of demand for Spain, France and 
Poland that are higher (in absolute terms) than those typically found in the literature. This implies 
that price increases lead to larger drops in sales volume and, thus, tax increases might not result in 
the expected additional tax revenues. 
 A macro level estimation of the relation between excise tax rates and revenues confirms a Laffer-
curve type relationship, i.e. that tax revenues cease to increase if excise tax rates reach a certain 
threshold level. The empirical evidence in this study suggest that the tax rates for beer and wine 
are well below this revenue maximising saddle point, but the evidence is inconclusive for spirits in 
the countries in question. 
 Using the simulation tool developed in this study, it is found that a one percent increase in the 
excise tax rates of each alcoholic beverage prevailing in 2016 in each of the countries will have the 
strongest negative effect on the market volumes of spirits, while for beer and wine these increases 
translate to by and large higher collected tax revenues.  
 Another noteworthy result is that in some scenarios excise tax increases result in decreases in VAT 
revenues due to a significant reduction in the higher value on-trade sales.  
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1 Motivation and Content of the Study 
In Europe a trend towards higher taxation of alcoholic beverages can recently be observed. While it is 
typically argued in recent years that higher taxation of alcoholic beverages is necessary to curb excessive 
consumption1 and its associated health costs (an idea originally articulated by Nordic states in Europe), a 
tax revenue motive is very often ongoing in the background. The underlying idea of a double dividend, 
i.e. the possibility of raising tax revenues while reducing socially unwanted behavior, appears to be 
attractive for many policy makers. Moreover, raising taxes is often described as a cost-effective policy 
measure for policy makers, meaning introducing taxes generate little costs for governments and should 
at the same time reduce alcohol related health costs. The latter very much depends on how different 
consumer groups (different socio-economic status, light, moderate or heavy drinker, etc.) respond to 
price changes. Unintended consequences, such as a move from the recorded to unrecorded market, 
need to be considered. Indeed, whether it is possible to raise additional tax revenues from the taxation 
of alcoholic beverages and/or reducing excessive consumption crucially depends on the functioning of 
the market for alcoholic beverages. A circumstance which deserves attention is that alcoholic beverage 
types are taxed very differently and, in most cases, spirits drinks are much higher taxed than beer or 
wine.  
The aim of the study is to shed more light on the functioning of the market for alcoholic beverages and 
the implied potential to raise tax revenues. The key parameters which determine the impact of taxation 
on the consumption are the price pass-through of the tax burden and the price elasticity of demand for 
alcoholic beverages. The price pass-through quantifies the extent to which excise duties and tax 
increases are passed on to the consumer price, whereas the price elasticity of demand measures the 
effect of consumer price changes on demand. Additionally, the cross-price elasticity between different 
types of alcoholic beverages (beer, wine and spirits) as well as non-alcoholic drinks can potentially 
impact the effects of tax changes on consumption, as some goods are seen as complements while 
others act as substitute to each other.  
In this study, we estimate these main parameters econometrically for a sample of three countries: 
Spain, France and Poland. Based on the estimated parameters the tax revenue effects for different tax 
reform scenarios are simulated for each country.  
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the available international 
empirical literature relating to estimates of tax pass-through and price elasticities. Chapter 3 outlines 
the current market situation for alcoholic beverages within the European Union. In chapter 4 the tax 
pass-through rates are estimated, exploiting information in two different datasets. The resulting 
estimates are compared to recent changes in excise duties in Poland, France and Spain. The chapter 
closes with a discussion of the different estimates obtained from the two datasets and the selection of 
specific parameters for the tax reform scenario simulations. Chapter 5 is devoted to the estimation of 
the price and cross-price elasticities for alcoholic beverages in the three countries. We first outline 
possible empirical approaches along with their advantages and disadvantages, along with the choice of 
two methods based on the availability of data. The following three subchapters contain the summaries 
of the estimation results for the three countries. The tax revenue simulation of reform scenarios is 
presented in Chapter 6. We start by outlining the core theoretical concepts behind tax reform 
                                                                
1
 The literature review by Wagenaar et al. (2010) found that public policies affecting the price have 
significant impact on alcohol related diseases and injuries whereas Nelson (2013b, 2015) found almost 
no effect on heavy and binge drinkers. 
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simulations with macroeconomic data. Then the choice of the specific model parameters used for the 
simulation of the tax reform scenarios are outlined. The chapter proceeds by providing a short user 
manual for the developed excel tool that permits the simulation of user-specific tax reform scenarios. 
The chapter then closes with a discussion of the results of a commonly requested tax reform scenario, a 
one percent increase in excise tax rates for all alcoholic beverages in the three countries. 
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2 Literature Review 
The literature on demand for alcohol is vast and so is the literature on taxation of alcoholic beverages 
and its impact on prices and quantities sold as well as the literature on empirical price elasticities of 
alcohol. Hence this short literature review should not provide an extensive overview but rather an 
indication of how this study compares to previously found results. For a broad and general overview of 
the issues relating to alcohol and the corresponding literature see also Anderson and Baumberg (2006). 
2.1 Price pass-through of excise taxes 
Two large studies by Rand Europe (Rabinovich et al. 2009, 2012) analyse the development of the alcohol 
prices and how excise taxation affects the affordability of alcoholic beverages in the European Union. 
That said, the affordability of alcohol is only one aspect of the impact of taxation on the market of 
alcoholic beverages. Even if alcohol becomes generally more affordable, this does not necessarily imply 
that the consumption of alcohol increases.
2
 In general, excise taxation only affects the affordability of 
alcohol if taxes are passed through to consumer prices. Therefore, Rabinovich et al. (2012) explicitly 
analyses the pass-through of excise taxes on prices for six countries and find a large heterogeneity 
among countries and beverages. Pass-through rates vary from significantly below unity for Ireland and 
Finland to strong over-shifting in Slovenia and Latvia. While the authors raise already a number of 
limitations (endogeneity of tax increases, omission of other factors, use of an average price index) the 
wide variation in the results can also be due to the econometric approach (regression using first 
differences) which only exploits the immediate price reactions. There are other academic studies which 
suggest an over-shifting of excise taxation to price. For example, Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002), 
Kenkel (2005), and Bergman and Hansen (2017) find evidence for significant over-shifting of excise 
taxation in the US, Alaska, and Denmark, respectively. On the other hand, Harding, Leibtag and 
Lovenheim (2010) find an under-shifting of beer taxes. Bergman and Hansen (2017) also find evidence 
suggesting asymmetric responses to tax cuts and tax hikes: taxes are over-shifted to a larger extent 
following tax hikes compared to tax cuts. Ardalan and Kessing (2017) find that value added taxes on beer 
are under-shifted while excise taxes are almost fully shifted to prices, in the European Union. In addition 
to excise taxation there are numerous further aspects (price changes for inputs, changes in market 
structure and consumption trends, etc.) which affect the pricing of alcoholic beverages. Therefore, the 
results from the literature might not be directly applicable for the three countries in this study.  
2.2 Price elasticities of alcoholic beverages 
To survey the literature on price elasticities of alcohol we first report results of meta-studies, which 
summarize a large number of individual studies and allow to gain further insights into the nature of the 
demand for different alcoholic beverages. In addition, we discuss studies which estimate different 
elasticities for subgroups of consumers or different distribution channels. Finally, we also briefly present 
a few studies, where price elasticities are estimated for France, Spain and Poland. 
                                                                
2
 Affordability does not account for relative prices, and therefore might overlook that other non-alcoholic drinks 
have become even more affordable. Additionally, a lower price level for alcoholic beverages might also be due to 
more competitive pressure in a declining market. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the affordability study pre-
dates the financial crisis and therefore is largely driven by fast growing income, which may no longer be the case.  
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2.2.1 Consensus estimates of price elasticities in Meta studies 
Recent meta-studies on the demand for alcohol adjust for the precision of individual elasticity estimates, 
i.e., they weight estimates by estimate precision, and thus allow to analyse the available information in 
a more efficient way. There are four major recent meta-studies: Nelson (2013), Fogarty (2010), 
Wagenaar et al. (2009) and Gallet (2007), which report unweighted averages of price elasticities of beer, 
wine and spirits, see Table 1. All of them report medians except Wagenaar et al. (2009), who report 
means. In general, the demand for beer is less elastic with respect to price than that of wine and spirits. 
The price elasticity of beer ranges between -0.32 and -0.46, the price elasticity of wine is between -0.55 
and -0.70, and the price elasticity of spirits ranges between -0.67 and -0.80. The simple averages 
reported in the four different meta-studies are rather similar for a given alcoholic beverage, which can 
also be seen in Figure 1, and values within these ranges are widely accepted as “consensus” values. 
Table 1: Price elasticities for alcohol beverages – unweighted medians/means 
Study Price elasticity Number of observations 
Nelson (2013) – unweighted medians   
   beer -0.32 191 
   wine -0.57 197 
   spirits -0.67 202 
   alcohol -0.54 117 
Fogarty (2010) – unweighted medians   
   beer -0.33 154 
   wine -0.55 155 
   spirits -0.76 162 
   alcohol n.a. n.a. 
Wagenaar et al. (2009) – unweighted means   
   beer -0.46 105 
   wine -0.69 93 
   spirits -0.80 103 
   alcohol -0.51 91 
Gallet (2007) – unweighted medians   
   beer -0.36 315 
   Wine -0.70 300 
   Spirits -0.68 294 
   Alcohol -0.50 263 
Source: Nelson (2013), Fogarty (2010), Wagenaar et al. (2009), and Gallet (2007). 
Meta-analyses often use the precision of study-level estimates to weight these estimates. Fixed-effect 
models use the inverse variances (standard errors) for weights, with dispersion in estimates only due to 
sampling error in each primary study. That is, all studies are assumed to estimate a common, or fixed, 
population elasticity. Estimates with smaller variation (standard error, variance) provide more precise 
information about the population value and are thus given greater weight. The assumptions underlying 
the fixed-effect model are quite strong, however, and so one usually considers additional approaches 
with less demanding assumption. The random-effects model also allows for variation in population 
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values by estimating a common inter-study variance based on observed variation of estimates, which is 
added to the study-level variance. Thus, in the random-effects approach the observed variation in 
estimates is partly due to sampling error and partly due to variation in the underlying population 
parameters.
3
 
Figure 1: Price elasticities for alcohol beverages – unweighted medians/means 
Source: Nelson (2013), Fogarty (2010), Wagenaar et al. (2009), and Gallet (2007). 
Notes: The graph shows medians except for Wagenaar et al. who report means. 
Among the four meta-studies cited above, two weight study-level estimates by estimate precision in 
their meta-analysis. These are Nelson (2013) and Fogarty (2010). The resulting fixed-effects and 
random-effects weighted means are given in Table 2. The fixed-effects weighted mean for the price 
elasticity of beer is -0.26 in both studies and is again smaller (in absolute value) than that of wine and 
spirits. The fixed-effects weighted mean for the price elasticity of wine is -0.34 and -0.83, as reported in 
Nelson (2013) and Fogarty (2010), respectively. These are quite different size effects. For spirits the 
fixed-effects weighted mean is -0.49 (Nelson) and -0.38 (Fogarty). The random-effects approach, which 
assumes less restrictive assumptions than the fixed-effects approach, shows results that are more 
similar across the two studies, for all three alcoholic beverages. The resulting means are -0.35 (Nelson) 
and -0.36 (Fogarty) for beer, -0.58 (Nelson) and -0.57 (Fogarty) for wine, and -0.64 (Nelson) and -0.52 
(Fogarty) for spirits. These numbers, and the small difference between the two studies, are shown in 
Figure 2. 
                                                                
3
 See Hedges and Olkin (1985) and Borenstein et al. (2010) for fixed-effect and random-effects models in meta-
analysis. 
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Table 2: Price elasticities for alcohol beverages – weighted fixed-effect and random-effects means 
Study Price elasticity: 
weighted fixed-effect 
means 
Price elasticity: 
weighted random-
effects means 
Number of 
observations 
Nelson (2013)    
   beer -0.26 (0.01) -0.35 (0.02) 172 
   wine -0.34 (0.01) -0.58 (0.03) 178 
   spirits -0.49 (0.01) -0.64 (0.03) 182 
Fogarty (2010)    
   beer -0.26 (na) -0.36 (na) 74 
   wine -0.83 (na) -0.57 (na) 73 
   spirits -0.38 (na) -0.52 (na) 70 
Source: Nelson (2013) and Fogarty (2010). 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The samples include only elasticity estimates for which also standard errors 
are provided. Nelson (2013) reduces this sample further by discarding 2.5% of the largest (smallest) effect-sizes and 
by discarding 2.5% of the largest (smallest) standard errors. Fogarty (2010) reduces this sample further by 
considering only Hicksian elasticity estimates. 
Figure 2: Price elasticities for alcohol beverages – random-effects weighted means 
Source: Nelson (2013), Fogarty (2010). 
Fogarty (2010) finds that differences between price elasticities across countries are rather small in 
general, with the exception of wine consumption in France. In addition, his results suggest a time trend: 
from 1904 until 1953 the price elasticity seems to become increasingly inelastic while afterwards it 
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seems to get increasingly elastic. Nelson (2013) finds a publication bias, which is reflected in larger price 
elasticities.
4
 
2.2.2 Heterogeneous elasticities different drinkers and distribution channels 
Different types of drinkers characterized by the amount of alcohol consumption may react differently to 
price changes. Purshouse et al. (2010a, 2010b) estimate the price elasticity of moderate drinkers (adult 
drinkers with a mean consumption per week of 21/14 or fewer units of alcohol for men/women) and 
hazardous and harmful drinkers (adult drinkers with a mean weekly consumption greater than 21/14 
units of alcohol for men/women) in the United Kingdom.
5
 Their findings indicate that moderate drinkers 
are less price sensitive compared to hazardous and harmful drinkers. This result applies to all alcohol 
beverages examined, which include beer, wine, spirits, and RTDs. Byrnes et al. (2016) investigate the 
price elasticity of drinkers at different average consumption levels (i.e., at different quantiles) in the 
United States, and the authors find a roughly decreasing trend of price elasticity. For the overall 
population of drinkers the price elasticity of alcohol is -0.96, while for the highest 10% of drinkers the 
elasticity is -1.26. A US study from 1994, on the other hand, finds rather a U-shaped price response of 
alcohol consumption, see Manning et al. (1995). The lowest (highest) 10% of drinkers display a price 
elasticity of -0.53 (-0.49), while the median drinker shows an elasticity of -1.19 and the overall 
population an elasticity of -0.80. The median drinker is thus more price elastic than the light and heavy 
drinkers. 
Price elasticities in the on-trade and off-trade markets generally differ. On-trade refers to alcohol sold to 
be consumed on the premises (pubs, bars, restaurants), and off-trade refers to alcohol sold to be 
consumed off the premises (shops). Meng et al. (2014) and Sousa (2014), for example, find beer to be 
more price elastic in the off-trade than in the on-trade, while spirits and wine are more price elastic in 
the on-trade than in the off-trade.
6
 The precise numbers for on- and off-trade beer are -0.79 and -0.98 
(Meng et al., 2014) and -0.34 and -0.74 (Sousa, 2014), the values for on- and off-trade wine are -0.87 
and -0.38 (Meng et al., 2014) and -0.24 and -0.08 (Sousa, 2014), and the elasticities for on- and off-trade 
spirits are -0.89 and -0.08 (Meng et al., 2014) and -1.25 and -0.45 (Sousa, 2014). Meng et al. (2014) thus 
generally find beer and wine to be a bit more price elastic than Sousa (2014), while they find spirits to be 
less price elastic than Sousa (2014). However, all elasticity estimates are within the range of historical 
estimates. 
2.2.3 Country-specific estimates of elasticities in Poland, France and Spain 
There are only few studies which investigate price elasticities for France, Spain and Poland at the 
country level. Those for France report very small elasticities, and thus basically an inelastic demand, for 
beer, wine and spirits, see Selvanathan et al. (2005a, 2005b) and Labys (1976). For Spain, on the other 
                                                                
4
 The corrected price elasticities would be -0.29 for beer, -0.46 for wine and -0.54 for spirits, see Nelson (2013), p.8. 
5
 Purshouse et al. (2010b) report very detailed tables for own- and cross-price elasticities in the United Kingdom, for 
beer, wine, spirits and RTDs (for low and high prices for a given beverage), for on-trade and off-trade, and for 
moderate drinkers and hazardous/harmful drinkers. We present these tables in the appendix, see Appendix A: 
Detailed own- and cross price elasticities in the UK. 
6
 The findings of Purshouse et al. (2010b), who examine price elasticities for on- and off-trade, for moderate and 
hazardous/harmful drinkers, and for low and high prices of alcoholic beverages, are only partially in line with these 
results. In the case of beer the above results only apply to moderate drinkers, and in the case of spirits the results 
only apply to low price spirits. Finally, wine is found to be more price elastic in the off-trade than in the on-trade, 
which is the opposite with respect to the above results. 
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hand, the price elasticities are considerably larger in absolute value, so the demand is much more 
elastic, for beer, wine and spirits, see Angulo et al. (2001). A different study finds a somewhat smaller 
price sensitivity for the consumption of wine, see Labys (1976). Two additional studies consider only 
young people (aged 14 to 18), see Gil and Molina (2009) and Gil Lacruz (2009), where the first finds wine 
to be less elastic than beer, which is in contrast to the consensus findings of the meta studies. The 
second study looks separately at price elasticities of males and females and finds positive, yet 
insignificant, price elasticities for females. In Poland, only the price elasticity of spirits was found to be 
negative (-0.62), elasticities for beer and wine are positive, but not significantly so, in the study by 
Florkowski and McNamara (1992). More recent studies report negative price elasticities for both wine 
and spirits, which are more or less in line with the meta studies, see Wolak (2015) and Bielinska-Kwapisz 
and Mielecka-Kubien (2011). Based on all four studies, the demand for beer seems to be either close to 
zero or insignificant. Table 3 summarizes the price elasticities for France, Spain and Poland.  
Table 3: Price elasticities for alcohol beverages for specific countries 
Study Beer Wine Spirits 
France    
   Selvanathan et al. (2005a) -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 
   Selvanathan et al. (2005b) -0.08 -0.09 -0.14 
   Labys (1976) na -0.06 na 
Spain    
   Gil and Molina (2009) -0.57 -0.39 -1.04 
   Gil Lacruz (2009), male 0.39 -1.68 -1.69 
   Gil Lacruz (2009), female 1.74 0.69 1.28 
   Angulo et al. (2001), conditional -1.17 -1.04 -1.04 
   Angulo et al. (2001), unconditional -2.44 -1.52 -4.65 
   Labys (1976) na -0.37 na 
Poland    
   Wolak (2015) 0.16 -0.98 -0.52 
   Bielinska-Kwapisz and Mielecka-Kubien (2011), conditional 0.03 -0.55 -0.91 
   Bielinska-Kwapisz and Mielecka-Kubien (2011), unconditional 0.03 -0.50 -0.76 
   Florkowski and McNamara (1992) 1.28 0.82 -0.62 
Source: Wolak (2015), Bielinska-Kwapisz and Mielecka-Kubien (2011), Gil Lacruz (2009), Gil and Molina (2009), 
Selvanathan et al. (2005a), Selvanathan et al. (2005b), Labys (1976), Angulo et al. (2001), and Florkowski and 
McNamara (1992). 
Notes: Wolak (2015), Bielinska-Kwapisz and Mielecka-Kubien (2011), Gil and Molina (2009), and Gil Lacruz (2009) 
report both Marshallian (uncompensated) and Hicksian (compensated) price elasticities. We show the Marshallian 
(uncompensated) elasticities, incorporating both the income and the substitution effect (see, e.g., Sousa, 2014, 
p.21). 
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3 Background: The market for alcoholic drinks in Europe 
The impact of excise taxes on prices and consequently on the demand for the tax commodities cannot 
be investigated in isolation. The larger economic environment, including general trends in consumer 
preferences and government regulation set a background, which influences the impact of excise 
taxation on the demand for alcoholic beverages. Therefore, this background chapter describes the most 
important developments in the market for alcoholic drinks in Europe in the last two decades. Note, that 
the data basis for this chapter and for this study in general is recorded alcohol consumption. It is very 
likely that there is additional unrecorded consumption. That said, unrecorded consumption most likely 
also remains untaxed and therefore is outside the scope of this study.  
The market for alcoholic beverages in many European countries is characterized through stagnant or 
even declining market volume. Health concerns and a changing lifestyle result in a generally lower 
demand for alcoholic beverages. These trends are often reinforced through government regulations, 
including specific excise taxes but also stricter alcohol limits for driving, or restrictions on advertising for 
alcoholic beverages. That said, the overall downward trend for the average alcohol consumption as 
depicted in Figure 3 is only clearly observable for the group of EU 15 countries.
7
 Starting with an overall 
consumption of over 12 liters of pure alcohol per adult in 1994 the trend is clearly downward. In 2016 
the overall consumption is clearly below 10 liters of pure alcohol per adult.  
Figure 3: Development average alcohol consumption in Europe 1994-2016 
 
Source: own calculations based on IWSR data 
The reduction in consumption is observable across the three broad categories of alcoholic beverages. 
For beer and spirits the relative decline is about one quarter, while for wine the decline is somewhat less 
pronounced with a reduction of approximately one fourth. In absolute numbers the reduction for beer 
was from 5 liters of pure alcohol per adult in 1994 to 3.8 liters in 2016. Given our assumption of 5% vol. 
alc. of a typical beer, this represents a reduction from a yearly consumption of 100 liters per adult to 76 
                                                                
7
 The EU 15 countries are the Member States before the enlargement in 2004, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. Data for Belgium and Luxembourg is combined in the IWSR data.  
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liters. In weekly drinks of 0.5 liters this equals a reduction from 3.8 to 2.9. The reduction for spirits was 
from 2.5 liters of pure alcohol to 1.9 liters. Converted into standard sized drinks (0.02 liters) per week 
this represents a decline from 5.9 to 4.5 drinks. In comparison the wine consumption declined from 5 to 
4.1 liters yearly or from 6.4 glasses (0.125 liters) to 5.3 glasses weekly.
8
  
For the new Member States the broad trend is rather different.
9
 The overall consumption of alcoholic 
beverages increases up to 2008 and starts to recede in the latest years. This reflects that in several of 
the Eastern European countries the markets for alcoholic beverages had to develop after the opening of 
the markets. The second striking observation is the much bigger share of spirits in the overall alcohol 
consumption in the new Member States. However, the importance of spirits in the overall consumption 
of alcohol is clearly declining. While the consumption of pure alcohol per adult in the form of beer has 
clearly increased from 3.5 liters in 1994 to 5.2 liters in 2016, the consumption in form of spirits receded 
from 4.1 liters to 3.3 liters. The consumption of wine in the new Member States only changed between 
1994 and 2015 only moderately from 2.5 liters of pure alcohol per adult to 2.2 liters. 
The marked difference between the EU 15 Member States and the new EU Member States already 
suggests that there are clear differences between individual countries. Figure 4 highlights these 
differences by plotting the share of the most popular alcoholic beverages in total alcohol consumption 
by country in 1997 and 2016. The color coding marks the most popular type; in countries marked 
through light blue triangles wine is the most popular alcoholic beverage, in countries marked through 
red dots beer is the most popular drink while the dark blue squares mark countries with spirits as the 
most popular alcoholic beverages.  
Figure 4: Comparison most popular alcohol beverages by country 1997 vs. 2016 
Source: own calculations based on IWSR data 
In 6 countries (Italy, France, Portugal, Greece, Malta and Slovenia) wine was the most consumed 
alcoholic beverage in both 1997 and 2016. In 10 countries (Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Cyprus, Czech 
                                                                
8
 We use 12 % vol. alc. for a typical wine and 40 % vol. alc. for a typical spirit for these conversions. 
9
 The new Member States includes the 13 EU countries which joined the EU in 2004 or later, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. Malta prior to 
1997 and Croatia prior to 2003 are excluded because of missing or inconsistent data. 
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Republic, Germany, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden) beer was the 
most consumed beverage and in 4 countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) spirits where the 
most consumed beverage at both points in time. In the remaining countries a change in the most 
consumed alcoholic beverage has been observed. In Romania and Spain beer superseded wine as the 
most popular alcoholic beverage, while in Hungary and Denmark the opposite development took place. 
In the Slovak Republic and Poland beer has been the most consumed alcoholic beverage in 2016 in 
contrast to 1997 when spirits where the most consumed alcoholic beverages in these countries. Overall, 
a relative shift away from spirits can be observed, together with a moderate convergence in tastes 
across countries. This is in line with Bentzen and Smith (2018) finding a long-run overall convergence in 
drinking patterns in the OECD, which is largely driven by the decline of wine in the traditional wine 
drinking countries while wine consumption increased in other countries. 
In the following we look at broad trends in the consumption of the three main types of alcoholic 
beverages over the time period 1994 to 2016 broken down by the individual countries. Figure 5 looks at 
the consumption of beer, Figure 6 shows the consumption of wine and Figure 7 summarizes the 
consumption of spirits.  
All three figures follow the same logic and color-code the development of over time. Red colored entries 
describe countries, where the consumption shows a downward trend over time, petrol show countries 
with an upward trend, darker blue entries show countries with a hump-shaped trend, pink entries 
describe a u-shape trend and for the countries with non-shaded entries no clear trend is observable.
10
 
The width of the bars in the figures depict the range of consumption over the years, i.e. the wider the 
bars the bigger is the change over time. In combination, the graph can be interpreted as following. A 
wide red bar shows a significant decrease in consumption while a large bar in petrol shows a clear 
increase in consumption. The entries are ordered according to the maximum per capita consumption in 
the observed time period. This implies that countries with a downward trend might be further down the 
ranking in more recent years, with countries with an upward trend (or a less strong downward trend) 
surpassing them in consumption. For example, the per capita beer consumption in Germany and 
Denmark is has decreased much more than in Austria, resulting in a higher per capita beer consumption 
in Austria in 2016.  
Figure 5 depicts the consumption of beer by country. Several of the typical beer drinking countries (e.g. 
the Czech Republic, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, Austria, the United Kingdom and Belgium) have 
experienced a downward trend in beer consumption the last two decades. In contrast, some of the 
Eastern European countries (Romania, Poland, Latvia and Bulgaria) have a clear upward trend in beer 
consumption. For other Eastern European countries like Estonia, Lithuania and Croatia the initial upward 
trend in beer consumption has turned resulting into an overall hump-shaped trend. Together with the 
upward trend in the beer consumption in Italy this results in a relative convergence of beer consumption 
among the European Union countries. 
                                                                
10
 We run two linear regressions on the year variable respectively on the year and year squared variable. The trend 
is classified as downward (upward) if the t-statistics of the linear regression on the year only is lower than -2.58 
(higher than +2.58) and absolutely higher than the t-statistics for the year variable in the regression including the 
squared term. The trend is classified as hump-shaped (u-shaped), if the t-statistics of the year variable is higher than 
+2.58 (lower than -2.58) and the t-statistics of the year squared variable is lower than -2.58 (higher than +2.58) and 
the t-statistics of the year variable is absolutely higher than in the regression including only the year variable. If 
neither of the regressions have a t-statistic of absolutely more than 2.58 we treat this as no clear consumption 
trend observable.  
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Figure 5: Alcohol consumption by country: Beer 1994-2016 
Source: own calculations based on IWSR data 
Figure 6 shows the corresponding development in wine consumption. France clearly stands out as the 
country with the initially clearly highest per capita wine consumption. At the same time a very strong 
downward trend is observable. For other countries with traditionally high per capita wine consumption 
the trends are less clear. Portugal and Slovenia have experienced an initial decrease followed by a 
recovery in per capita wine consumption which results in a u-shape trend, while in Italy the opposite is 
true. The increase in per capita consumption turned in a recent downward trend resulting in an overall 
hump-shaped trend. In Austria and Spain, the observable trend is downward. Overall, there is much less 
of convergence in per capita wine consumption observable, which is also due to countries like Cyprus 
and Poland where the initially low per capita wine consumption further declined. 
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Figure 6: Alcohol consumption by country: Wine 1994-2016 
Source: own calculations based on IWSR data 
Figure 7 shows the development of per capita consumption of spirits by country. Here the Baltic 
countries stand out with the highest per capita consumption. The consumption over time is rather 
volatile – which is reflected by the wide range of the bars in Figure 7 - but apart from Lithuania where a 
clear upward trend is identifiable no clear patterns over time emerge. Other Eastern European countries 
also have a relatively per capita high consumption of spirits. Several of them are also characterized with 
a declining trend. In particular in the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and Hungary the per capita 
consumption of spirits is declining. In Poland, a recent increase in per capita consumption results in a u-
shape pattern overall, while Bulgaria is characterized with an overall increase in spirits consumption. 
Southern European countries are by and large characterized through a declining per capita consumption 
of spirits. This decline is particularly pronounced for Spain, but also observable for Cyprus, Greece, 
Portugal and Italy. Overall, there is no clear pattern of convergence observable, but rather a continuing 
difference between different regions. The Baltic countries and most countries in Eastern Europe remain 
the countries with a relatively high level of per capita consumption in spirits while several of the 
Southern European countries are at the other end of the spectrum with a low per capita consumption of 
spirits.  
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Figure 7: Alcohol consumption by country: Spirits 1994-2016 
Source: own calculations based on IWSR data 
In Figure 8 we use the detailed information about the consumption of spirits by countries to identify 
more specific trends in consumer preferences for spirits. Following the exact same logic as in the 
previous graphs, we show the most consumed spirit types by country. In the Baltic countries and Poland 
Vodka is predominant. However, the variation over time is substantial and in the case of Poland, there is 
a strong decline in vodka consumption observable. In Bulgaria, and Cyprus brandy (other than cognac) is 
the most consumed spirit, but again with a very strong downward trend. In fact, the strong downward 
trend in typical spirits can be observed in many countries, e.g. for rum in the Slovak Republic, vodka in 
the Czech Republic, genever in the Netherlands, aniseed in France or for scotch whiskey in Spain. In 
contrast, there are only a few cases where a clear upward trend in the consumption of specific sprits can 
be observed. Apart from some cases in Eastern Europe (e.g. Fruit Eaux de Vie in Romania, Bulgaria, and 
the Slovak Republic and other brandy in Lithuania) where the increase potentially reflects more the 
transition to a market-based economy, the only observable upward trends are for Scotch whisky in 
Malta and Cyprus and for vodka in Malta and the United Kingdom.  
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Figure 8: Alcohol consumption by country: Most consumed spirits 1994-2016 
 
Source: own calculations based on IWSR data 
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For Spain, Poland and France we additionally draw on micro-level survey data to gain more insights on 
the recent trends in the respective markets for alcoholic beverages. Two main data sources are 
available; the household budget surveys (HBS) and the European Health Interview Survey (EHIS). These 
data sources inform about purchases/consumption at the household or individual level.
11
 Table 4 
reports the share of households which report purchases of alcoholic beverages in Spain, Poland and 
France. While the majority of the households in Spain and Poland report some purchases of alcoholic 
beverages, almost three quarters of the households in France report no purchases of alcoholic 
beverages. Together with the fact that the latest available dataset is from 2010, the much smaller 
sample size for France casts some serious doubt on the data quality. Nevertheless, some consistent 
findings emerge for all three countries. In Spain and France Wine plays a much bigger role than in 
Poland. At the same time, spirits are much more prevalent in Poland than in Spain or France. Beer plays 
an important role in Poland and Spain, but much less so in France.  
Table 4: Purchases/consumption of alcoholic beverages, Spain, France, Poland (HBS) 
 
Spain Poland France 
No alcoholic beverage 40.6% 35.6% 73.2% 
Beer only  16.6% 25.8% 5.0% 
Wine only 13.6% 4.1% 10.6% 
Spirits only 1.5% 5.3% 4.0% 
Beer and wine 17.0% 6.5% 2.6% 
Beer and spirits 2.0% 13.5% 1.0% 
Wine and spirits 1.6% 2.1% 2.7% 
Beer, wine and spirits 7.2% 7.2% 1.0% 
Sample size (No. Households) 22,010 36,886 15,797 
Notes: Data for Spain and Poland from HBS 2016. Data for France from HBS 2010. Percentage values 
indicate percentage share of sample. 
Source: own calculations HBS data 
Additionally, Figure 9 graphically illustrates the emerging consumption patterns. The black squares 
present the total sample and the circles the share of households which consume the three types of 
alcoholic beverages. The overlapping regions indicate that households consume more than one type of 
alcoholic beverages. Figure 9 shows clearly, that there is significant overlap in the consumption of 
alcoholic beverages, especially for the consumers of spirits in Spain and Poland. This is a first indication 
that substation between the different types of alcoholic beverages can be of importance.  
                                                                
11
 See also Section 5 for a short description of the information contained in the household budget surveys. 
Furthermore, we use the purchases of alcoholic beverage interchangeably with consumption.  
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Figure 9: Household consumption patterns France, Spain and Poland (HBS data) 
 
Source: own calculations HBS data 
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The second important information which can potentially be derived from micro-level data is the 
frequency and intensity of alcohol consumption. The household budget survey reports the quantity of 
alcohol purchases. Relating these quantities to the number of individuals over 18 in the households 
allows a classification of household members into abstainers, light, moderate or heavy drinkers. Table 5 
reports the resulting values. For Spain, approximately half of the household members are classified as 
light drinkers, while for about 3.6 percent of the households the classification of heavy drinkers applies. 
The picture is quite different from Poland, where more than 60 percent of the household members are 
classified as light drinkers and only 0.7 percent fall in to the category heavy drinkers. The share of heavy 
drinkers is highest with 6.3 percent in France, while almost three quarters of the households are 
classified as abstainers.  
Table 5: Households by drinking behaviour, Spain, France, Poland (HBS) 
 
Spain Poland France 
Abstained (0g/day) 40.5% 35.6% 74.5% 
Light (<20g/day)  47.9% 60.6% 13.4% 
Moderate (20-39g/day) 8.0% 3.1% 5.9% 
Heavy (>40g/day) 3.6% 0.7% 6.3% 
Notes: Data for Spain and Poland from HBS 2016. Data for France from HBS 2010. Percentage values 
indicate percentage share of sample. 
Source: own calculations HBS data 
Using the information about the alcohol consumption from previous waves of the household budget 
survey for Spain and France one can learn that these patterns appear to be changing slowly. In Spain we 
can observe a shift from moderate drinkers towards abstainers, while for Poland the opposite is true. 
The tendencies for moderate or heavy consumption are less clear in both countries.
12
  
The information about the intensity of the alcohol consumption can be complemented with the 
information about the frequency of alcohol consumption for the EHIS. Table 6 reports the results for 
Spain and Poland. In Spain about 16.6 percent of the respondents report daily alcohol consumption. At 
the same time roughly one third report no alcohol consumption in the last twelve months or respond 
that they never consume alcohol. This is broadly in line with the share of abstainers found in the HBS 
data. For Poland a much smaller number of respondents (1.5%) report daily alcohol consumption. The 
share of reported abstainers is somewhat larger than a quarter (15.9% with no alcohol consumption in 
the last 12 months and 11.9% with no alcohol consumption). There is, however, also a significant 
number of interview partners (8.9%) which decline to answer the question on alcohol. It can therefore 
be assumed that the estimated frequency of alcohol consumption in Poland is a lower bound estimate.  
  
                                                                
12
 Some caveats remain because of a reporting bias, especially for heavy consumption, which could obscure such 
tendencies. 
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Table 6: Frequency of alcohol consumption, Spain and Poland (EHIS) 
 
Spain Poland 
Every day 16.6% 1.5% 
5-6 days/week  1.2% 0.9% 
3-4 days/week 3.5% 3.2% 
1-2 days/week 15.5% 8.7% 
2-3 days/month 9.6% 11.5% 
Once a month 7.6% 13.2% 
< once a month 11.8% 24.3% 
Not in past 12 months 12.8% 15.9% 
Never 21.2% 11.9% 
Don’t know/ refusal 0.2% 8.9% 
Notes: Data for Spain and Poland from EHIS 2014. Percentage values indicate percentage share of sample. 
Source: own calculations EHIS data 
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4 Tax Pass-Through 
Changes in excise taxation on alcoholic beverages only will affect consumption if they are passed on to 
consumer prices. Therefore, the extent of the tax pass-through of excise taxes is a key parameter for the 
estimation of the tax revenue effect triggered by changes in excise taxation. Theoretically, the pass-
through of excise taxes can take on any value; immediate and full pass-through to consumer prices, less 
than full pass-through or over shifting of the tax burden.
13
 The main determinants of the pass-through 
are the relative elasticities of supply and demand. These, in turn, are amongst others depending on the 
market structure in the industry and its pricing power and the consumer preferences. While it is beyond 
the scope of the current study to investigate the determinants of the tax pass-through in detail, a 
general idea of the extent is necessary to model the tax revenue effects. To this end, we estimate the 
observed tax pass-through based on two independent sources of price data. The starting point is the 
detailed information from the consumer price index (CPI) available from Eurostat. Additionally, we use 
the price information, which is implicitly available in the IWSR data. Finally, we sum up the discussion of 
the tax pass-through by separately investigating the developments in France, Poland, and Spain. 
4.1 Estimated tax pass-through based on CPI measures 
In the context of the monthly measurement of inflation Eurostat collects detailed information about the 
price development of goods and services. Based on this data a monthly CPI is calculated for each of the 
EU countries. The overall CPI is composed of more disaggregated sub-indices, which are harmonized 
across Europe according to the COICOP classification.
14
 We use the development of the sub-indices 
CP.02.1.1 Spirits, CP.02.1.2 Wine and CP.02.1.1 Beer to investigate the impact of tax changes on the 
price. The CPI data does only report an index with the base value 2015=100. To relate these price 
changes to the changes in the tax burden, we convert the excise taxes into a change of tax of a typical 
product in percent of the price of the product. Therefore, two steps of calculations are necessary. First, 
we need to convert the excise tax to the tax burden on a liter of typical product. And second, we need a 
reference price of a liter of the alcoholic beverage.  
The conversion of the excise tax uses the same assumptions about the strength of the alcoholic 
beverages than introduced in the previous section. We take 5 % vol. alc. for a typical beer, 12 % vol. alc. 
for a typical wine and 40 % vol. alc. for a typical spirit. These assumptions are held constant for all 
countries and years.  
To get the reference prices we use the implicit information about unit prices in the IWSR data. 
Specifically, we derive the prices for beer, wine and spirits by dividing the reported sales value through 
the reported sales quantities, both for the year 2015. Additionally, we take the average price of the 
most consumed variety of spirits (e.g. vodka, scotch whiskey, etc.) as the reference price of spirits in 
2015. In Table 7 we report the implied price per liter for all EU 28 countries. The values for the most 
consumed variety of spirits range from 4.11 Euro in Romania to 43.43 Euro in Sweden. In comparison, 
the average price all spirits vary slightly less across countries with an average price between 6.82 in 
                                                                
13
 See also Benedek et al (2015) for a brief summary of the theoretical mechanisms of tax pass-through in the 
context of VAT changes. For a summary of empirical results see also IFS et al. (2011).  
14
 COICOP stands for “Classification of individual consumption by purpose”. Eurostat classifies consumption 
expenditures into 12 main categories which in turn are subdivided into groups of items and so on. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nomenclatures/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_NOM_DTL&StrNom=HICP_2000&St
rLanguageCode=EN&IntPcKey=&StrLayoutCode=EN for more detail. 
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Romania and 38.22 in Ireland. Regarding the variety of spirit with the highest sales volume, we can 
identify a group of 9 countries where vodka is the most consumed variety and the average price of 
vodka is below the average price for all spirits. Another group of 8 countries has scotch whisky as the 
spirit variety with the highest sales volume and the average price of scotch whisky is above the average 
price for all spirits in all of these countries.  
Table 7: Average prices for 1 liter of spirits in EU 28 countries 2015 
 Average price for 1 litre of  
Country Most-consumed spirit variety most-consumed spirit variety all spirits 
Austria Vodka 17.99 19.03 
Belgium/Luxembourg Scotch Whisky 21.47 19.12 
Bulgaria Other Brandy 5.97 7.91 
Croatia Fruit Eaux de vie 13.28 13.52 
Cyprus Scotch Whisky 23.65 20.88 
Czech Republic Scotch Whisky 12.22 13.49 
Denmark Aquavit 25.05 26.98 
Estonia Vodka 15.44 19.05 
Finland Vodka 24.71 29.94 
France Scotch Whisky 18.96 17.60 
Germany Vodka 11.68 13.73 
Greece Scotch Whisky 30.10 22.42 
Hungary Fruit Eaux de vie 14.72 14.02 
Ireland Vodka 33.43 38.22 
Italy Bitters 13.12 15.05 
Latvia Vodka 14.19 17.16 
Lithuania Vodka 11.62 12.71 
Malta Scotch Whisky 26.40 22.80 
Netherlands Liqueurs 16.07 20.19 
Poland Vodka 9.53 10.59 
Portugal Scotch Whisky 20.16 17.30 
Romania Fruit Eaux de vie 4.11 6.82 
Slovak Republic Vodka 10.98 12.82 
Slovenia Bitters 18.63 18.24 
Spain Gin 17.90 14.73 
Sweden Scotch Whisky 43.43 37.70 
United Kingdom Vodka 26.53 29.78 
Note: The most-consumed variety is identified as spirit type which has the highest sales volume in Euro in 2015. 
The average prices are not reported per se, but rather defined as the ratio between the sales volume and the litres 
sold.  
Source: own calculations based on IWSR data 
In the next step we combine the 2015 prices with the CPI indices to calculate the reference prices in the 
other time periods. To avoid the impact of exchange rate changes we convert all values into national 
currencies using the official exchange rate information as reported by the European Commission in the 
excise duty tables. Denoting 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡  as the excise tax per liter of product 𝑗 (beer, wine, spirits) in the month 
𝑡 in country 𝑖 and 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 as the unit price of the same product we then define the tax change as 
∆𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡−𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
 . 
We use two measures of the inflation rate to see whether these tax changes are passed through. First, 
we define the year-on-year (YoY) inflation as the change in the CPI for alcoholic beverage 𝑗  in country 𝑖 
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in month 𝑡, to the CPI in the same month the year before, hence 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑌𝑜𝑌 =
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡−12
− 1. This measure 
eliminates seasonality in the price index because it compares the same months across the years. An 
immediate and full pass-through of the tax change will therefore show higher inflation rates for twelve 
months. After that, the inflation rate returns to its previous level, given no other interacting events 
occur. 
Alternatively, the inflation measure can be based on the month-on-month (MoM) change in the CPI. 
Then the inflation measure is defined as 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑜𝑀 =
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
− 1 . In this case, the immediate and full price 
pass-through should be visible only in the inflation rate of the very same month. Furthermore, one can 
also investigate a delayed pass-through of the excise taxes by including further lags of the tax changes. 
We also allow for an anticipated pass-through in the month before the tax change. One additional 
concern which can affect the MoM inflation rate is seasonality in the CPI measures. To address this 
issue, we also include month dummies 𝜹𝒕. More generally, to also take into account other economic 
developments in the countries we include the general inflation for all goods and services (Πit, defined 
according to the same logic as the CPI for the alcoholic beverage) as well as country fixed effects 𝜇𝑖, 
which capture all time-invariant characteristics of the countries.  
The two regression equations are therefore 
(1) 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑌𝑜𝑌 = 𝛽1∆𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6Π𝑖𝑡
𝑌𝑜𝑌 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(1') 𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑜𝑀 = 𝛽0∆𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 + 𝛽1∆𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡−2 + 𝛽4∆𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡−3 + 𝛽5∆𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡−4 + 𝛽6Π𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝑜𝑀 + 𝜸𝜹𝒕 +
𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the remaining error term.  
In Table 8 we present the results of the pass-through estimates for an unbalanced panel of all EU28 
countries from 1996 to 2017.
15
 The first four columns present the estimates for regression equation (1) 
with the year-on-year inflation. The tax pass-through is rather similar for beer (0.652), wine (0.696) and 
spirits (0.679) and somewhat smaller (0.499) if we use the price of the most consumed spirit as 
reference price. The difference between the two results for spirits is remarkable, since we use the same 
tax and CPI information for the two regressions. The difference stems purely from the reference price in 
the year 2015. Specifically, using the average price of the most-consumed variety of spirits results in 
higher prices (and therefore scales down the tax changes) for 11 countries.
16
 For the other 17 countries, 
the average price of the most-consumed variety of spirits is lower than the average price for all types of 
spirits and hence the tax changes in these countries will be magnified because they are related to a 
lower price. Given that there are more countries where the tax change is magnified, a lower tax pass-
through is a matter of arithmetics. That said, part of the difference is also due to a higher pass-through 
in those countries where the most-consumed variety of spirits is less expensive than the average spirit.
17
 
The rest of Table 8 presents the results for the pass-through estimates using the month-on-month 
inflation as specified in regression equation (1'). These specifications allow investigating the time 
pattern of the pass-through. For all alcoholic beverages we see the lions’ share of the pass-through in 
                                                                
15
 The panel is unbalanced because for the Eastern European countries price and tax data are not available for early 
years. Furthermore, the IWSR data reports Belgium and Luxembourg together. Therefore we use the combined 
reference prices for 2015 for both countries.  
16
 Belgium and Luxembourg, Cyprus, France, Greece, Hungary, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 
17
 A regression on the split sample confirms this conjecture. The average pass-through for the 17 countries with 
lower average price on the most consumed variety is 0.71, while for the other 11 countries the average pass-
through is 0.62.  
 
 IHS – Price elasticity and implied tax revenue effects for alcoholic beverages - 23 
 
the first two months. For beer (with an overall pass-through over 5 months of 0.889) and wine (overall 
pass-through of 0.942) we cannot rule out a complete pass-through of taxes. For spirits the overall pass-
through is somewhat lower at 0.797, but the 95% confidence interval still contains full pass-through. 
Interestingly, we find a moderate anticipation effect of tax changes for the spirits.  
Table 8: Estimates of tax pass-through based on CPI price data 
  Year on Year Inflation Month on Month Inflation 
 
Beer Wine Spirits 
typical 
spirit Beer Wine Spirits 
typical 
spirit 
Tax changet+1      0.003
    
 0.029
    
 0.059
**
 0.048
**
 
     (0.021)
    
 (0.031)
    
 (0.024)
    
 (0.019)
    
 
Tax changet 0.652
***
 0.696
***
 0.679
***
 0.497
***
 0.746
***
 0.709
***
 0.527
***
 0.396
**
 
(0.211)
    
 (0.197)
    
 (0.174)
    
 (0.205)
    
 (0.179)
    
 (0.080)
    
 (0.141)
    
 (0.164)
    
 
Tax changet-1      0.165
***
 0.253
***
 0.118
***
 0.080
**
 
     (0.052)
    
 (0.090)
    
 (0.044)
    
 (0.035)
    
 
Tax changet-2      0.014
    
 0.074
    
 0.039
**
 0.028
**
 
     (0.028)
    
 (0.045)
    
 (0.016)
    
 (0.013)
    
 
Tax changet-3      -0.010
    
 -0.102
*
 0.046
*
 0.033
*
 
     (0.052)
    
 (0.052)
    
 (0.022)
    
 (0.018)
    
 
Tax changet-4      -0.028
    
 -0.021
    
 0.008
    
 0.005
    
 
     (0.023)
    
 (0.032)
    
 (0.012)
    
 (0.009)
    
 
General 
Inflationt 
0.715
***
 0.573
***
 0.736
***
 0.737
***
 0.209
***
 0.125
***
 0.113
***
 0.120
***
 
(0.089)
    
 (0.077)
    
 (0.128)
    
 (0.129)
    
 (0.052)
    
 (0.032)
    
 (0.048)
    
 (0.049)
    
 
Country 
fixed-effects 
       
Month 
dummies 
       
No. 
Observations 
5,960
    
 5,951
    
 5,951
    
 5,951
    
 5,985 5,976
    
 5,976
    
 5,976
    
 
within R
2
 0.158
    
 0.150
    
 0.141
    
 0.137
    
 0.143
    
 0.146
    
 0.257
    
 0.234
    
 
Combined 
pass-through 
   
  0.889*** 0.942*** 0.797*** 0.591*** 
        (0.224)     (0.121)     (0.148)     (0.198)     
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. 
***
,
**
,
* 
denotes significance
 
at the 1, 5 respectively 10% level. 
Combined pass-through is the linear combination of the tax changet+1 to tax changet-4. 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat and IWSR data 
Again, using the average price of the most-consumed spirits variety the estimated tax pass-through is 
much lower (0.591 overall). This lower pass-through is again driven by arithmetics, but also bears the 
message that pass-through is different depending whether the most consumed variety of spirits is 
cheaper than the average spirit or not. Interestingly the immediate pass-through is lower in the 
subsample of 17 countries with a relative cheap variety of most-consumed spirit, while the overall pass-
through is higher. Conversely, the immediate pass-through is higher for the other 11 countries, but due 
to little delayed pass-through in the following months the overall pass-through is lower.
18
  
                                                                
18
 The subgroup of the 17 countries with the higher-priced most-consumed variety has an immediate pass-through 
of 0.549 and an overall pass-through of 0.742. In contrast the immediate pass-through for the other 11 countries is 
only 0.441 while the overall pass-through is 0.958. Additionally, there is not anticipation effect observable in these 
countries. 
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Since the national market for spirits appears to play a crucial role in tax pass-through the next 
subsection will investigate the pass-through for different types of spirits in more details. 
4.2 Estimated tax pass-through based on IWSR price information 
The price information for different varieties of spirits is available from IWSR for 27 countries on a yearly 
basis for the time between 2000 and 2016. The main advantage is that we have direct information about 
average prices for all spirits overall and for the different varieties. Therefore, we can directly relate the 
absolute tax burden on a liter of finish product 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡  to the average price 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡.
19
 To control for the impact 
of general inflation or other macroeconomic development we include both the change in the overall 
consumer price index Πit and the logarithm of nominal GDP Yit . In line with the previous regressions we 
also capture all time-invariant country characteristics by including country fixed effects 𝜇𝑖  and 
additionally include year dummies 𝜹𝒕 to control for common macroeconomic shocks. Hence the 
regression equations are  
(2) 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2Yit + 𝛽3Πit + 𝜹𝒕 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the remaining error term. Due to insufficient data we are not able to estimate the 
pass-through for beer or wine based on IWSR data. Hence, Table 9 only reports the estimates for the 
pass-through for spirits overall and for the most-consumed spirit variety.  
Table 9: Estimates of tax pass-through for spirits based on IWSR price data 
  Average price of  
  all Spirits most-consumed spirit variety 
Tax changet 0.990
***
 1.084
***
 
(0.074)
    
 (0.099)
    
 
Log(GDPt) 0.276
    
 -0.755
    
 
(1.573)
    
 (1.870)
    
 
General inflationt 0.008
    
 0.026
    
 
(0.086)
    
 (0.098)
    
 
Country fixed-effects   
Year dummies   
No. Observations 392
    
 392
    
 
within R
2
 0.820
    
 0.692
    
 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. 
***
,
**
,
* 
denotes significance
 
at the 1, 5 respectively 10% level. 
Source: own calculations based on IWSR data 
The pass-through on the price is very close to unity, both for spirits overall (0.990) and for the most 
consumed variety (1.084). But estimates are not only very close to unity, but also are rather precisely 
estimated, i.e. the standard error is small. Neither the GDP, nor the general inflation rate, explain any of 
the price variation. This is mainly due to the country and time fixed effects which already explain a large 
part of the remaining variation of the average prices.   
                                                                
19
 Note that the index 𝑡 now denotes the year, and 𝑗 only stands for spirits and most-consumed spirits.  
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Figure 10: Estimates for price pass-through for spirits, by types of spirits  
Source: own calculations based on IWSR data 
In Figure 10 we graphically summarize the estimated pass-throughs for each of the spirit varieties. 
Starting on the left hand side with the estimated pass-through for spirits overall we then rank the 
varieties of spirits by the estimated pass-through. For liqueurs and bitters we find a pass-through below 
unity. For aquavit, scotch whisky, gin, aniseed, other spirits, rum and genever the estimated pass-
through is close to unity, while for Irish whiskey, vodka, cognac, other whisky, other brandy and fruit 
eaux de vie the estimates point towards over shifting of taxes onto prices.  
4.3 Development in excise taxes on alcoholic beverages and price development in France, Poland and 
Spain 
For the three countries which are in the focus of this study, i.e. for France, Poland, and Spain, we 
received additional price information from Nielsen. Specifically, we have monthly price data for off trade 
sales in broad drink categories. We use the price values for beer, wine, and the most consumed type of 
spirits (vodka for Poland, brown spirits for France and Spain) to define the tax change in percent of the 
price. In Figure 11 we present the development over the time period 2001 to 2017 for France. The upper 
graph in Figure 11 contrasts the development of the price changes against the changes in excise 
taxation. The lower graph in Figure 11 compares the development of the price indices to the price index 
for food and non-alcoholic drinks.  
The top part of the upper graph shows the development of the beer price (year-on-year change in the 
CPI) and the changes in the excise taxation of beer. The substantial increase in the taxation of beer in 
January 2013 is clearly visible in the inflation rate for the following 12 months and suggests a slight over-
shift of the tax burden. The middle part shows the development of the wine price and highlights once 
more that the excise taxation of wine is negligible in France. The lower part in the upper graph shows 
the development of the CPI for spirits and the corresponding tax rate changes. The substantial tax 
increase in January 2012 results in an increased inflation rate for the following 12 months, but it appears 
that this particular tax increase was not fully passed on to consumers.  
The lower graph in  Figure 11 compares the price changes of the three types of alcoholic beverages to 
the change in the price of food and non-alcoholic beverages. Up to 2012 the price index for food in 
France increased faster than for each of the three alcoholic beverages. The increase in the price index 
for food levelled off the recent years, while the price index for continued to increase. The prices indices 
0
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for beer and spirits both jumped in reaction to the respective tax increases and levelled-off in the 
following month. Overall, this resulted in a price index above the one for food and non-alcoholic drinks 
for both beer and wine, while the price index for spirits is below. 
Figure 11: Prices and excise tax changes for alcoholic beverages in France 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
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Figure 12 repeats this exercise for the development of prices and excise taxation of alcoholic beverages 
in Spain.  
Figure 12: Prices and excise tax changes for alcoholic beverages in Spain 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data 
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The taxation of beer remained largely unchanged over the observed period, the slight reduction in 
January 2010 is followed by lower inflation rates for beer. This period, however, coincides with the 
recovery of the Spanish economy from the great recession and therefore the low inflation rate could be 
due to non-tax reasons. In Spain, no tax pass-throughs for wine can be analysed, because Spain levies no 
excise taxes on wine. The excise tax increases in Spain were less concentrated than in France. Moderate 
increases can be observed in January 2002, January 2005, September 2005, January 2014 and December 
2016. All of these tax increases coincide with an increased inflation rate in the following twelve months, 
and the larger tax increases appear to have resulted in full pass-through to consumer prices.  
The lower part of Figure 12 compares the price indices of alcoholic beverages to the price index for food 
in Spain. Food prices increased faster in Spain up to 2009. The financial crisis resulted in a drop in food 
prices and a less steep increase during the recovery. In contrast, the beer price index continued to 
increase up to 2016 and only recently saw a moderate decline. Prices for spirits by and large followed 
the beer prices up to 2009 and then continued to increase at a lower rate. The prices for wine, in 
contrast, followed a completely different path and did not increase substantially between 2001 and 
2007. The price increases between 2007 and 2009 and 2012 and 2014 were not strong enough to bring 
up the price index for wine to the price indices of food or the other alcoholic drinks. So overall, beer and 
food prices have increased relatively in Spain in the period 2001 to 2017, while wine has become 
cheaper compared to spirits.  
Figure 13 shows the development of prices of alcoholic beverages and their taxation in Poland. For beer 
and wine, the only relevant tax change was the increase in March, respectively January 2009. Both tax 
increases resulted in a significant increase in the inflation rate over the coming year, which suggests 
substantial over-shifting of the tax increase. For spirits there was a significant tax reduction in October 
2002, which resulted in a substantial price drop. An incomplete pass-through of a tax decrease is 
constituent with patterns commonly found in the empirical literature.
20
 The moderate tax increase in 
January 2005 was not passed through to consumer prices while the tax increase in January 2009 results 
in a price pattern which suggests an immediate and full pass-through. In contrast, the more substantial 
tax increase in January 2014 resulted in less than a full pass-through.  
The lower part of Figure 13 shows that the food price index has increased much faster in Poland than 
the price index of any of the alcoholic beverages. The price index for spirits drops markedly with the 
reduction in the excise tax in 2003. Ever since the prices for spirits primarily jumped due to excise tax 
changes. In contrast prices for beer and wine roughly followed the trend of the food price index up to 
2010. Over the last couple of years, the price increases for beer and wine were much lower than for 
food. So overall, the price indices for alcoholic beverages in Poland suggest that the producers were not 
able to pass to general inflation on to consumers recently.  
                                                                
20
 See Benedek et al. (2015) for a study on asymmetric pass-through of consumption taxes. Incidentally, the tax 
decrease in Poland 2002 was conditional on a price decrease of at least 20 %. Given that the drop in excise duty was 
approximately 30 %, an incomplete price pass-through was sufficient to meet the legal requirement to benefit from 
the tax decrease. 
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Figure 13: Prices and excise tax changes for alcoholic beverages in Poland 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
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4.4 Towards consensus estimates of price pass-throughs for alcoholic beverages 
The estimates for the pass-through of excise taxes seem partly contradictory. Estimates using the CPI 
price measures suggest a pass-through for spirits of less than 100 percent. In contrast, using the IWSR 
price data a full pass-through for spirits is found. Hence this subsection aims to reconcile these results. 
The short literature survey in section 2.1 shows that there is considerable heterogeneity in the results of 
empirical studies but confirms the tendency that the price pass-through for beer is more likely to be 
lower than 100 percent. Given the lack of other consistent evidence, the assumption of near perfect 
pass-through for wine also appears to be innocuous. For spirits, however, there is the issue to reconcile, 
whether taxes are fully pass-through to prices or not. 
Some potential explanations for the finding of an imperfect pass-through can be found in the academic 
literature. For example, a recent paper by Ally et al. (2014) showed that the price pass-through is not 
necessarily symmetric, but rather likely varies by price category. Specifically, Ally et al. (2014) find that 
supermarkets in the UK tended to undershift the tax increases for cheap products, while for the more 
expensive products an over proportional price increase was found. These findings can be indirectly 
backed up by the findings from Conlon and Rao (2016) who stress the impact of ‘sticky’ prices in the 
context of tax pass-through. Simply put, retail prices are not set arbitrarily but rather at round numbers 
or at an amount just below the full dollar. This affects the price pass-through since for a small tax 
increase it may not be feasible to increase the price. However, with a higher initial price level of the 
alcoholic beverage it is more likely that a price increase to a round number is possible, even for smaller 
tax increases.   
Another explanation for the finding of an imperfect pass-through with the CPI price data is due to 
composition effects in the CPI measure. Whenever consumers substitute from a product with high price 
increases to a product with relatively lower price changes, the consumption basket is not adjusted 
immediately. This bias in measuring the inflation due to this problem is called the substitution bias. 
However, the weights in the consumption basket are required to be updated on a yearly basis based on 
recent price changes in order for the HICP to remain representative of consumption patterns. While 
there are no weights at product or even brand level available, the development of the CPI weights at the 
alcoholic beverage type level in Figure 14 shows that there is significant variation in the weights over 
time. Given that the weights are derived from the household consumption surveys, which are executed 
every five years, and then price-updated based on recent price developments, we can interpret the 
weights as the expenditure shares.  
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Figure 14: CPI weights for alcoholic beverages (excl. restaurants and bars) in France, Poland and Spain 
Source: Eurostat. 
Beginning with Poland, which has the highest absolute expenditure share for alcoholic beverages, we 
see an increase for all three types of alcoholic beverages in 2004, followed by a clear drop in 2008.
21
 
Overall the expenditure shares for beer increased while the ones for spirits and wine fell to back to the 
(or below the) level of 2001. The consequence is that in recent years the expenditures for beer (16.66 ‰ 
in 2017) surpassed the expenditures for spirits (15.74 ‰ in 2017). In comparison the expenditure for 
wine in Poland was at 5.47 ‰ in 2017.  
In France, wine remained the alcoholic beverage with the highest expenditure share, albeit with a 
moderate decline in importance from 11.44 ‰ in 2001 to 10.30 ‰ in 2017. In contrast, we can observe 
a moderate increase in the consumption expenditure for spirits (from 5.46 ‰ to 7.47 ‰) and beer (from 
2.37 ‰ to 3.55 ‰). Notably, most of the increase is due to the change in 2011 and 2016.   
Spain has the lowest overall expenditure shares for alcoholic beverages which partly reflect the low 
prices. Both wine (from 4.50 ‰ to 3.38 ‰) and spirits (from 1.73 ‰ to 1.49 ‰) saw a decline in 
expenditure share, while the expenditure share for beer increased from 2.76 ‰ in 2001 to 3.33 ‰ in 
2017.  
Combining the results of the estimations with the findings of the literature and the considerations about 
nominally rigid prices and composition effects in the price measures we aim to get a consensus estimate 
for the modelling in section 5. These values are collected in Table 10. For beer and wine, we have the 
main results from Table 8 to start with, namely a pass-through of around 0.9 for beer and roughly 1 for 
wine. The finding of a slight undershifting for beer is consistent with the literature, while there is not 
much evidence for price pass-through of excise taxation on wine. The country specific information in 
Figure 12 additionally suggests that the price pass-through for beer was less pronounced in Spain. 
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 While the weights – representing the share of expenditure – are adjusted yearly, the large changes reflect new 
rounds of the household budget survey in the respective countries. Especially for an Eastern European country like 
Poland, these changes in the consumption patterns are more pronounced, because of the recent transition to a 
market-based economy.  
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Therefore, we use 0.85 for the price pass-through for excise taxes on beer in Spain, while we use 0.9 for 
Poland. For France we saw even some overshifting of the large tax increase in 2013. At the same time, 
all the inflation adjustments in the more recent year were not passed through at all. We therefore also 
stick to the average pass-through for beer excise taxes of 0.9 for France. Given, we have no any 
additional information, we use the estimate from Table 8 to approximate the price-pass-through wine 
for all three countries with the value 1.  
For the price pass-through for spirits we have several conflicting estimates. While the CPI based 
estimates suggests less than full pass-through, the estimates based on the prices derived from IWSR 
point towards full pass-through. Since the CPI measures can be affected by substitution effects between 
different drink types and different quality types, we put more emphasis on the IWSR estimates. Starting 
with the estimate of a full price pass-through we adjust the price-pass-through for France slightly to 
0.95. This adjustment accounts for the fact, that the most consumed spirit types in France are Aniseed 
and Scotch whisky. For both spirit types the estimated pass-through is found to be slightly below 1.  
For gin, the most consumed spirit type in Spain, the estimated price pass-through is very close to 1.  
Therefore, we do not adjust the overall price pass-through for Spain. In contrast, in Poland, the most 
consumed spirit type is Vodka, where the point estimate for the price-pass-through for Vodka would in 
principle call for a higher price pass-through. At the same time, the country specific information in 
Figure 13 does not support significant overshifting of excise taxation. Additionally, the issue of quality 
upgrading is particular pertinent in the situation of a lower price country like Poland and a potentially 
lower-priced drink like Vodka. Therefore, we use a price pass-through of only unity for spirits in Poland 
as well.    
Table 10: Consensus estimates for price pass-through in France, Poland and Spain 
  Price-pass-through for  
  Beer wine spirits 
France 0.9 1.0 0.95 
Poland 0.9 1.0 1.0 
Spain 0.85 1.0 1.0 
Source: own calculations and considerations based on IWSR data. 
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5 Estimation of price elasticities for France, Poland and Spain 
In the empirical literature various econometric methods are used to estimate the elasticities of demand 
for alcoholic beverages with respect to price. Referring to the meta-study of Fogarty (2010) we may 
distinguish between  
1) log-linear single equation models,  
2) system-wide utility-based estimation approaches on cross-section or pooled data,  
3) (pseudo-)panel data models, 
4) time series models, and 
5) selection models on cross-sectional or panel data.  
The first method, the simplest and oldest approach, relates the logarithms of demand to the logarithm 
of price and some controls to obtain an estimate of the price elasticity (see for instance Stone, 1945 or 
Prest, 1949). However, these simple models have been superseded by the system-wide utility-based 
approaches, notably the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) or Rotterdam, CBS or NBR models (see 
Duffy, 2001). These models use data on expenditure shares and prices (or unit values) of different 
products from household surveys and estimate a restricted demand system derived from economic 
theory. The main advantage of these models is the solid microeconomic theoretical background, while 
the major limitations are the data requirements. Since these systems are usually estimated including 
each product of a more general category (i.e. beverages), the prices and budget shares of all relevant 
complements and substitutes for each product of that category needs to be available. Based on the 
results obtained from these models, we are also under the impression that system-wide utility-based 
approaches yield overly elastic price elasticities. Such models can be estimated on either cross-sectional 
data, exploiting spatial price variation (see Deaton, 1990 or Chávez, 2016) or using a pool of 
consumption surveys from several years (see Aepli, 2014). Since the surveyed households change over 
the years, the resulting pool of data over several years does not result in a panel, where each individual 
(in this case the household) is observed throughout the years.  
This feature of the data has led to the application of pseudo-panels (see Meng et al., 2014), where the 
individual units are constructed by taking averages over selected time-invariant characteristics (such as 
year of birth, gender, socio-economic group, etc.). The main advantage of the pseudo-panel approach is 
that it is easily implemented given data availability and the averaging over the defined stratum 
eliminates possible measurement errors in unit values used as approximation for prices. Disadvantages 
included that zero purchases are eliminated via averaging or dropped from the sample beforehand, and 
that potentially valuable information in the variation of prices and quantities among individual 
households is lost (see Pryce, 2016).  
These shortcomings can be eliminated if proper panel data, i.e. the same individuals or households 
report their consumption over multiple periods, is available. Examples for studies including such data 
are Aguiar and Hurst (2007), Sharma, Vandenberg and Hollingsworth (2014) and Harding et al. (2012). 
They employed the Nielsen Company’s HomeScan panel survey data that tracks the product codes of 
each purchase of a large number of individuals over time along with some fundamental socio-economic 
data. Such data allows for a proper handling of quality (since unique product codes are available), 
controlling for unobserved individual characteristics (preferences and behaviour) and common time 
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effects (such as Christmas). The main limitation is that such data is rarely available for research. The 
authors of this study failed to get access to such a detailed dataset for France, Poland and Spain. 
Another method that has become popular with the availability of better data is time series models, such 
as error correction models (see Johnson et al., 1992). These methods particularly address the problem 
of spurious correlation, i.e. a significant effect of a variable on another that is mainly driven by a 
common unobserved trend in both variables. The main limitation of these approaches, besides data 
availability, is that important control variables such as income are potentially unavailable for higher 
frequency data (monthly and weekly). For this reason, we decided against this method for estimation of 
price elasticities, even though time series data from AC Nielsen was available.
22
 As shown in the 
literature review section, estimates of time series models on average point to very inelastic price 
reactions for alcoholic beverages, especially when compared to system-wide utility-based approaches.   
The fifth method comprises all approaches related to household consumption data that control for zero-
consumption via one or more selection mechanisms (see Angulo et al., 2001). Famous examples within 
this family of models include the Heckman Selection model (see Heckman, 1979), the double-hurdle or 
the infrequent purchase model (see for example Blundell and Meghir, 1987). These models are 
particularly popular for researchers analysing survey data on consumption of households, where 
members are asked to record the monetary value and quantity of items they purchased during some 
period, usually a week or two. Data on such surveys usually contains a large number of observations 
with zero purchases for particular products. The decision not to purchase might either 1) reflect the fact 
that there was no desire for that particular product during the one to two weeks where the 
consumption diary is recorded (infrequent purchase), 2) represent a fundamentally non-economic 
decision of the household motivated by ethical, psychological or social considerations altering the 
consumer's preferences (abstainer), 3) or be motivated by economic reasons such as the price of the 
product or the available income. 
5.1 Empirical approach 
To estimate the price elasticities of the alcoholic beverages we will rely on the Household Budget Survey 
of the three countries that are available either annually (Poland and Spain) or every five years (France). 
The dataset thus consists of a large number of households that are pooled over several years, without 
an explicit panel structure, since the specific households covered by each survey wave differ. Given this 
data source the econometric methods available are the system-wide utility-based estimation 
approaches and selection models. We will apply these two methods for estimating the price elasticities 
for Spain and Poland. Due to data restriction, we revert to simpler OLS for estimation of French price 
elasticities.  
The advantage of the two-step estimation procedures is that it allows estimating the influence of certain 
variables and characteristics such as income, gender and education on the decision to consume and the 
amount consumed separately. Furthermore, the price elasticities for each alcoholic beverage are 
estimated separately, and the second stage (modelling the amount consumed) is restricted to 
households with non-zero consumption of the respective alcoholic beverage. By contrast, the demand 
system jointly estimates the own- and cross-price elasticities of all alcoholic beverages (and soft drinks) 
on a sample of all households with a non-zero consumption in at least one of the alcoholic beverages. 
The two methods are thus applied to different samples, with the two-stage procedure yielding estimates 
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 We estimated a number of time series models (results are not reported), but obtained largely positive 
or insignificant own-price elasticities.  
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on the price elasticity of a specific beverage only for the sub-population of the sample that consumes 
that specific beverage. The resulting elasticities of the demand system implicitly capture the price 
effects on households that do not purchase one or more alcoholic beverages. Therefore, if we assume 
that the price also exerts an effect at the extensive margin, i.e. the decision to consume a good, we may 
expect that the QAIDS will result in more price sensitive estimates. 
The two-step estimation procedure will be estimated on a number of sub-samples of the data. In a first 
series of estimations, we estimate the price elasticities for (1) all household, (2) households with up to 3 
adults, (3) up to 2 adults, (4) one adult and (5) single households (i.e. adult with no kids). This procedure 
ensures that we transparently show the effects of the trade-off between a large sample (all households) 
and the ability of the sample to enable identification of individual price elasticity (one adult households). 
As can be seen in the result tables below, limiting the sample to households with one adult or singles 
usually results in a sufficient number of observations for beer and wine, but the sample size rapidly 
declines for other wines (sparkling, …) and spirits. 
In the second series of estimations we divide the sample based on the drinking behaviour of the 
households. Categorizing light, moderate and heavier drinking is a tedious task, since alcoholic 
beverages differ substantially in their alcoholic content, even within beverage category (see Dufour, 
1999). Furthermore, there is no international consensus
23
 on how much grams of alcohol per day is 
considered moderate. In this study we stick to the definition given in Aepli (2014) that is based on Swiss 
standards. Hence, we define light drinkers as consumers of < 20 grams, moderate 20-39 grams and 
heavy >40 grams pure alcohol per person per day. We convert the consumed litres of alcoholic beverage 
to pure grams of alcohol assuming 86.9 grams pure alcohol per litre for wine, 37.9 grams for beer and 
316 grams for spirits. Limiting the sample further to just one adult household in order to get a closer 
approximation to an individual price elasticity would result in a very small sample size. We therefore 
decided against a further breakdown of the sample, which means that the definition of light, medium 
and heavy drinker refer to the average person of a household. For example, being classified as a heavy 
drinking household in a household with three adults of which two are abstainers, would require the 
third adult to consume more than 120 grams of pure alcohol per day, while based on an individual 
definition this third adult would be classified as a heavy drinker when consuming more than 40 grams. 
Using average household consumption for households of more than one adult to define drinking 
behaviour should therefore underestimate the proportions of medium and heavy drinkers. 
In the third series of estimations, we split the sample into the four income quartiles, using the reported 
household income, and estimate the price elasticities for each income quartile. Again, we do not further 
restrict the sample to one adult households due to sample size restrictions.  
Household Budget Surveys (HBS) 
National Statistical Offices of the member countries of the European Union regularly (annually or every 
five years) carry out household budget surveys, where the statistical units of interest are a 
representative number of private households. The aim of the HBS is to provide information about 
household final consumption expenditure on goods and services (by detailed COICOP classification), as 
well as information on income, demographic and socio-economic characteristics. One of the prime 
objectives is to collect information on household consumption expenditure for use in updating the 
‘weights’ for the basket of goods used in the Consumer Price Indices and the harmonised index of 
consumer prices at an EU level (see Eurostat, 2010). Additionally, the data collected via the HBS gives 
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 For a list of thresholds per country see www.iard.org/policy-tables/drinking-guidelines-general-
population/. 
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insights into the living conditions of private households and may be used to study the distribution of 
income/consumption and poverty. 
The HBS unit of observation for expenditures and quantities of specific products is the household, i.e. 
we cannot identify individual consumption behaviour but only the purchasing decisions taken by all 
members of the household. Most countries further collect monthly household income, regional 
information (NUTS, size of municipality, population density …), and household size, among others. 
Additionally, to the information recorded at the household level, information on demographics and 
socio-economic status, such as age, gender, education, employment status, occupation, monthly 
income, main source of income, etc. are collected for each household member level. In order to link this 
information to the respective households, we use the data for the “household reference person”, that 
is, the person aged 16 or more who most contributes to the household income (see Eurostat, 2010). 
Since the consumption of food and beverages is only recorded during a specific period of between one 
to two weeks, the HBS usually include weights for each household that may be used to calculate the 
figure representative for the yearly consumption of that particular household type. Household 
stratification is usually done via region, household size and some socio-economic characteristics. In the 
following estimations we will use the consumption a particular household recorded multiplied by the 
respective temporal weight factor, i.e. for biweekly consumption diaries we multiply the recorded 
values by 26 to obtain an estimate of yearly consumption. 
The goods and services are recorded in the Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose 
(COICOP) that allows the identification of the off-trade consumption of beer (including non-alcoholic), 
still wine, other wine (including Cava, Champagne, Málaga, Moriles, Montila, Oloroso, Amontillado and 
Moscatel) and spirits and liquors (including non-alcoholic). However, all on-trade consumption of 
alcoholic beverages is contained within the COICOP groups covering expenditures on restaurants and 
bars, that does not allow a further disaggregation with respect to alcoholic beverage. Hence, the 
following estimations only relate to off-trade consumption of alcoholic beverages.  
A standard item that is recorded in each HBS and in every wave is the consumption expenditures by 
households of detailed products and services. However, the HBS in some countries and for some survey 
waves (especially older vintages) do not contain data on quantities purchased. For instance, our data on 
Spain and Poland covers quantities in all of the ten years of HBS used, while the HBS of France only 
started recording quantities (or at least providing the respective files for scientific use) from 2010 
onwards. Since we need total expenditures and quantities to derive unit values that can be used as an 
approximation for the product price, we only employ the cross-section of the 2010 HBS wave of France 
for the estimations, while we can use the full pooled 10-year HBS waves for Spain and Poland. 
Derivation of Prices 
The first challenge when using household consumption data is the derivation of unit prices, i.e. in our 
case the price per litre of beer, still wine, other wine and spirits. Given that the respective HBS contains 
data on both expenditures and physical quantities, it is possible to divide one by the other to obtain unit 
values. However, we cannot simply take these unit values for demand analysis for at least two
24
 reasons. 
Most importantly, differences in unit values may reflect different product qualities (see Deaton, 1988), a 
problem that is particularly severe for wine. The widely adopted empirical approach to remedy this 
problem is to use the variation in unit values that is unexplained
25
 by household and household member 
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 Another reason not discussed in more detail here includes measurement errors in the reported 
expenditures and quantities.  
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 This is done via a hedonic price model, regressing the unit values on  characteristics 
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characteristics that serve as an approximation for quality (see Angulo, Gil and Gracia, 2001 based on 
Gao, Wales and Cramer, 1995). Characteristics commonly employed here include the income and socio-
economic characteristics such as education or the main source of income, i.e. salary, self-employed, 
capital income, unemployment benefits, etc. The main shortcoming of this approach is that it only 
delivers quality-adjusted unit values for households that consume the product in question. Hence, this 
may substantially reduce the sample size in estimations including cross-price elasticities, since only 
households that report non-zero consumption for each product considered can be included.  
A second approach is to exploit the spatial and time variation of the data and calculate average prices 
per region-year cell. The assumption underlying this approach is, that geography, transport 
infrastructure, institutions, the local competitive situation and market structure determine differences 
in prices within the country (see Deaton, 1988). This assumption is also the main caveat of this 
approach, since it may be very likely to hold in developing countries but may be violated in developed 
economies with high quality infrastructure and functioning antitrust agencies. The main advantages of 
identifying prices via spatial variation are first, that an average price that is also less prone to 
measurement error and second that it can be applied to each observational unit in the region, without 
the loss of households with zero consumption on some alcoholic beverages. We will follow this 
approach as described in Aepli (2014), who estimated alcohol price elasticities for Switzerland. 
5.2 Spanish price elasticities for alcoholic beverages 
To estimate the price elasticities of beer, wine and spirits in Spain we use data from the Spanish Budget 
Household Survey for the years 2006-2015. The distribution of prices using the method outlined in Aepli 
(2014) can be found in Appendix B. In the following we present the summaries of the results of the two-
stage Heckman estimations, reporting only the second stage
26
 price and cross-price elasticities for beer, 
still wine, other wine and spirits. Besides the four alcoholic beverages, we also include the price of soft
27
 
drinks (other beverages, COICOP 01.2.2.2.), since these drinks can be regarded as substitute or 
complement (for mixed drinks). A description of all variables included and a summary of their impacts in 
both stages of the decision process is given in Appendix C. Prior to the estimations we discarded 
observations of households with more than five members aged 18 and above as well as the top and 
bottom 5% of observations with respect to the quantity of the respective alcoholic beverage consumed 
per adult. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the quantity purchased per household member 
aged 18 and above of the respective alcoholic beverage. All prices are included in logarithms as well, to 
enable the interpretation of the resulting coefficients as elasticities. 
The results of the price elasticities using the two-stage Heckman selection model are reported 
separately for each alcoholic beverage group (beer, wine still, wine other and spirits) per household size, 
income group and drinking behaviour.
28
 Table 11 shows the own price and cross-price elasticities of 
Spanish beer consumption by household size. Column (1) reports the results when including all 
Households with up to five members aged 18 and above, which leaves us with approximately 80,000 
household-year observations that recorded non-zero amounts of beer (second stage). The own-price 
elasticity with -1.25 is rather larger compared to the empirical results of the international literature. The 
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 Detailed estimation results for the first (decision to buy) and second (decision on quantity) are 
available from the authors upon request. 
27
 However, we do not include prices of coffee, tea, cocoa, mineral water, fruits and vegetable drinks as 
potential complements or substitutes. 
28
 Drinking behaviour is defined as total alcohol consumed (sum of alcohol in grams of all alcoholic 
beverages consumed) per adult person in household per day. 
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only statistically significant cross-price elasticity is that for still wine, which is negative and thus points 
towards beer and wine being complements rather than substitutes. Columns (2) to (4) repeat this 
analysis on samples restricted to up to 3, up to 2 and one adult (i.e. aged above 18) Households 
respectively. Eliminating larger households for one reduces the sample size, but it also eases the 
interpretation of the resulting price elasticity. Since we only observe the total consumption of alcoholic 
beverages at the household levels, results on samples with households consisting of fewer members of 
drinking age, more closely resemble individual price elasticities. The corresponding own-price elasticity 
of beer declines gradually to a value of -0.68 for one-adult households. Restricting the analysis further to 
single households (one adult with no kids) results in an elasticity of -0.52. 
Table 12 shows the results per drinking behaviour and income group. We do not split up the sample 
further according to household size as before, since the sample size for the specific strata would be too 
small for robust inference. The absolute values of the resulting elasticities should therefore not be 
interpreted at face value, but rather relative to the results of the respective comparison group (i.e. 
income or drinking behaviour). The results in Columns (1) to (3) would thus indicate somewhat smaller 
own-price elasticity for heavy drinkers of beer compared to medium and light drinkers. Medium drinkers 
view spirits as a substitute, while for light drinkers wine acts as a complement. Columns (4) to (7) show 
the price elasticities by income quartiles, with IncQ1 being the poorest and IncQ4 being the richest 
income group. Consumption of beer seems to be slightly more unresponsive in the poorest and richest 
quartile.  
The results for Spanish own-price and cross-price elasticities by household size for still wine are 
summarized in Table 13. Contrary to the own-beer price elasticities, the wine price elasticities are rather 
stable over different household sizes and amount to between -0.13 and -0.22. Spirits seem to be a 
complement to wine. The price elasticities for Spanish still wine consumption by drinking behaviour and 
income group are given in Table 14. Contrary to the beer consumption pattern (see above), only the 
light drinking households show a significant own-price elasticity of -0.2. For these households, soft 
drinks are viewed as a substitute. Spirits are a complement and beer seem to be a strong substitute for 
medium drinkers. The results in Columns (4) to (7) indicate that the price responsiveness of still wine 
consumption declines with increasing income. While the poorest household quartile shows a statistically 
significant own-price elasticity of still wine of -0.31, the price elasticity of the richest quartile is 
statistically insignificant at -0.05. Overall the results suggest that still wine in Spain is consumed along 
with spirits and that the price elasticity of wine is rather low in Spain. The latter result may stem from 
the fact that the price of Spanish bottle of wine is relatively low compared to international standards. 
Table 15 contains the results of own- and cross-price elasticities for spirits consumed in Spain by 
household size. The sample size for one adult and single households is very small yielding larger 
standard errors and partially statistically insignificant results. Focussing on Columns (1) to (3), it can be 
seen that Spanish consumer respond very strongly to price changes of spirits, with own-price elasticities 
of between -1.14 to -1.26. The results suggest that beer can be viewed as a complementary drink to 
spirits. Table 16 shows the results by drinking behaviour and income group. The own-price elasticity of 
spirits drops from -1.27 for light, to -0.48 for medium and a statistically insignificant -0.28 for heavy 
drinkers. The results thus suggest that heavy drinkers are essentially unresponsive to price changes 
when it comes to hard liquor. Compared among different income groups, it is found that the price 
responsiveness increases, even though not monotonically, with income. Besides beer (see also Table 
15), more or less robust and significant substitutes or complements cannot be found for Spanish spirits.  
Table 17 summarizes the results of the price elasticities of Spanish consumption of other wines by 
household size. We focus the discussion of the results on Columns (1) to (3), as the sample size of one 
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adult and single households with non-zero consumption of other wines is too small for robust inference. 
The own price elasticity of other wines ranges from -0.32 to -0.35 and beer as well as spirits seem to be 
strong complements with cross-price elasticities of -0.89 to -1.68. The results by drinking behaviour and 
income group do not offer strong
29
 additional insights. Overall the results suggest that other wines, such 
as champagne and cava, are usually consumed together with beer and spirits.  
The results for the price elasticities of soft drinks are given in Table 48 and Table 49 in Appendix D.  To 
summarize, the own price elasticities of soft drinks lie between -0.38 and -0.64 and beer, wine and to 
some extent other wines are complements. However, we do not find robust evidence for a 
complementarity with spirits, as could be expected in case of mixed drinks consumption.  
The separate results from the two-stage Heckman selection regressions can be compared to the results 
of the full demand-system estimation in Table 19. We restricted the sample to households with non-
zero consumption in at least one alcoholic beverage. Therefore, the sample just includes households 
that purchase alcoholic beverage just as in the two-stage estimations, but it also includes households 
with zero consumption in some of the alcoholic beverages. Thus, the resulting elasticities also implicitly 
include an extensive margin, i.e. they also depict the impact of price of for instance beer on households 
that only purchase wine and/or other wines and/or spirits. The own-price elasticities beer, still wine, 
other wines and spirits are -1.34, -0.71, -0.64 and -1.92, respectively and thus somewhat larger (in 
absolute values) than the ones from the two-stage estimations, hinting towards the additional negative 
impact on prices for the decision to consume a specific alcoholic beverage.  
The QAIDS estimation results in several significant coefficients on cross-price elasticities. We will focus 
on those with higher values, i.e. those that are economically more important regarding their impact. 
Increasing the price of beer by one percent results in an increase of soft drinks by half a percent. Raising 
wine prices by one percent reduces soft drink consumption by a quarter percent. Beer consumption 
reduces by around three quarter of a percent for each one percent increase in the price of other wine, 
whereas wine consumption increases by nearly half a percent. This means that other wine acts as a 
complement to beer but a substitute to wine. Raising spirit prices by one percent would decrease wine 
consumption by a bit more than a third of a percent but increases soft drink consumption by more than 
half of a percent. An increase of the price of soft drinks by one percent will increase beer consumption 
by half a percent, decrease wine purchases by a third percent and increases spirits consumption by a 
fifth percent.  
The QAIDS estimation results allow the recovery of income elasticities of the alcoholic beverages. These 
elasticities are respectively 0.83 for beer, 0.93 for wine, 1.34 for other wine and 1.77 for spirits. Hence, 
the results suggest wealthier households allocate a larger share of their budget on alcoholic beverages 
to other wine and spirits. 
 
                                                                
29
 The results may suggest that only light drinkers respond to price changes, since the coefficients on medium and heavy drinkers 
are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. However, the larger standard errors for the latter two groups may be a result 
of the smaller sample size.  
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Table 11: Spanish Beer Price elasticities by Household Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All up to 3 Adults up to 2 Adults one Adult Single HH 
      
Beer own-price -1.245 -1.150 -0.994 -0.672 -0.524 
 (0.0676)*** (0.0716)*** (0.0805)*** (0.148)*** (0.140)*** 
      
Wine (still) cross-price -0.208 -0.237 -0.272 -0.117 -0.0746 
 (0.0281)*** (0.0298)*** (0.0335)*** (0.0634) (0.0598) 
      
Other wine cross-price -0.0237 -0.00948 -0.0214 0.0137 -0.00708 
 (0.0210) (0.0222) (0.0250) (0.0466) (0.0442) 
      
Spirit cross-price -0.0163 0.00153 -0.0539 -0.0932 0.0848 
 (0.0422) (0.0447) (0.0501) (0.0949) (0.0905) 
      
Soft Drinks cross-price -0.0820 -0.216 -0.245 -0.0181 -0.00521 
 (0.0751) (0.0794)** (0.0889)** (0.164) (0.155) 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 190,310 170,812 133,016 30,153 26,404 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 80,698 69,405 49,900 7,370 6,273 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. 
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Table 12: Spanish Beer Price elasticities by drinking behaviour and income group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Light Medium Heavy IncQ1 IncQ2 IncQ3 IncQ4 
        
Beer own-price -1.153 -1.399 -1.007 -1.161 -1.320 -1.486 -1.039 
 (0.0726)*** (0.162)*** (0.252)*** (0.142)*** (0.132)*** (0.131)*** (0.136)*** 
        
Wine (still) cross-price -0.239 -0.101 0.0588 -0.350 -0.187 -0.0982 -0.219 
 (0.0301)*** (0.0674) (0.108) (0.0598)*** (0.0546)*** (0.0557) (0.0556)*** 
        
Other wine cross-price -0.0173 -0.0682 -0.0542 -0.0129 0.00945 -0.0568 -0.0444 
 (0.0225) (0.0497) (0.0792) (0.0450) (0.0421) (0.0414) (0.0397) 
        
Spirit cross-price -0.0611 0.694 0.270 -0.144 0.0673 -0.0304 0.0270 
 (0.0452) (0.101)*** (0.158) (0.0928) (0.0852) (0.0818) (0.0790) 
        
Soft Drinks cross-price -0.0527 -0.121 -0.893 0.0678 -0.173 0.0668 -0.345 
 (0.0805) (0.179) (0.279)** (0.162) (0.148) (0.147) (0.144)* 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 171,385 13,317 5,608 47,976 47,787 47,364 47,183 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 68,372 9,036 3,290 15,666 19,775 21,805 23,452 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. 
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Table 13: Spanish Wine (still) Price elasticities by Household Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All up to 3 Adults up to 2 Adults one Adult Single HH 
      
Beer cross-price -0.00681 -0.0204 0.0158 -0.0601 0.0767 
 (0.0668) (0.0705) (0.0790) (0.128) (0.119) 
      
Wine (still) own-price -0.175 -0.198 -0.227 -0.132 -0.175 
 (0.0287)*** (0.0302)*** (0.0338)*** (0.0574)* (0.0529)*** 
      
Other wine cross-price 0.0449 0.0391 0.0409 0.0254 0.0493 
 (0.0205)* (0.0216) (0.0243) (0.0407) (0.0377) 
      
Spirit cross-price -0.634 -0.602 -0.554 -0.206 -0.160 
 (0.0415)*** (0.0438)*** (0.0492)*** (0.0844)* (0.0785)* 
      
Soft Drinks cross-price 0.182 0.112 0.0239 0.0449 0.231 
 (0.0744)* (0.0784) (0.0878) (0.146) (0.135) 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 191,230 171,694 133,761 30,327 26,494 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 72,614 62,584 45,018 7,082 6,271 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. 
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Table 14: Spanish Wine (still) Price elasticities by drinking behaviour and income group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Light Medium Heavy IncQ1 IncQ2 IncQ3 IncQ4 
        
Beer cross-price 0.0990 1.101 0.308 -0.185 0.267 -0.340 0.160 
 (0.0691) (0.160)*** (0.238) (0.136) (0.129)* (0.132)** (0.138) 
        
Wine (still) own-price -0.200 -0.115 -0.0444 -0.311 -0.218 -0.150 -0.0478 
 (0.0297)*** (0.0671) (0.0995) (0.0585)*** (0.0556)*** (0.0578)** (0.0580) 
        
Other wine cross-price 0.0324 0.110 0.292 -0.00889 0.117 0.0785 -0.0167 
 (0.0211) (0.0486)* (0.0767)*** (0.0427) (0.0402)** (0.0410) (0.0400) 
        
Spirit cross-price -0.627 -0.479 -0.498 -0.582 -0.646 -0.697 -0.600 
 (0.0427)*** (0.100)*** (0.146)*** (0.0888)*** (0.0828)*** (0.0816)*** (0.0797)*** 
        
Soft Drinks cross-price 0.232 -0.0342 0.371 0.644 0.183 0.188 -0.226 
 (0.0770)** (0.176) (0.264) (0.154)*** (0.146) (0.149) (0.147) 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 171,816 15,182 4,232 48,136 48,059 47,659 47,376 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 58,201 11,372 3,041 14,894 17,888 19,246 20,586 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. 
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Table 15: Spanish Spirits Price elasticities by Household Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All up to 3 Adults up to 2 Adults one Adult Single HH 
      
Beer cross-price -0.578 -0.611 -0.454 -0.515 -0.0130 
 (0.139)*** (0.154)*** (0.180)* (0.453) (0.174) 
      
Wine (still) cross-price -0.0779 -0.118 -0.253 -0.336 -0.0799 
 (0.0577) (0.0639) (0.0748)*** (0.206) (0.0765) 
      
Other wine cross-price 0.0553 0.0855 0.0572 0.119 0.0267 
 (0.0417) (0.0463) (0.0550) (0.146) (0.0570) 
      
Spirit own-price -1.259 -1.156 -1.139 -0.814 -0.154 
 (0.0850)*** (0.0949)*** (0.112)*** (0.310)** (0.120) 
      
Soft Drinks cross-price 0.432 0.267 0.167 0.753 0.152 
 (0.153)** (0.169) (0.199) (0.522) (0.196) 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 196,203 175,985 136,643 30,909 27,007 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 28,785 23,174 14,727 1,541 1,218 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. 
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Table 16: Spanish Spirits Price elasticities by drinking behaviour and income group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Light Medium Heavy IncQ1 IncQ2 IncQ3 IncQ4 
        
Beer cross-price -0.154 -0.261 -0.588 -0.894 -0.0535 -0.853 -0.643 
 (0.155) (0.310) (0.313) (0.303)** (0.279) (0.264)** (0.269)* 
        
Wine (still) cross-price -0.134 0.102 0.121 -0.0550 -0.0301 0.0161 -0.191 
 (0.0636)* (0.129) (0.137) (0.130) (0.115) (0.112) (0.107) 
        
Other wine cross-price 0.0690 0.111 0.0592 0.0919 0.00514 0.0248 0.0935 
 (0.0453) (0.0959) (0.102) (0.0970) (0.0853) (0.0799) (0.0748) 
        
Spirit own-price -1.273 -0.477 -0.288 -0.955 -1.121 -1.465 -1.310 
 (0.0928)*** (0.197)* (0.201) (0.201)*** (0.179)*** (0.161)*** (0.150)*** 
        
Soft Drinks cross-price 0.481 -0.0660 0.115 0.823 0.357 -0.0184 0.512 
 (0.168)** (0.347) (0.351) (0.349)* (0.308) (0.295) (0.279) 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 174,296 15,750 6,157 49,347 49,261 48,942 48,653 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 19,986 6,288 2,511 4,703 6,809 8,141 9,132 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. 
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Table 17: Spanish Other wine Price elasticities by Household Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All up to 3 Adults up to 2 Adults one Adult Single HH 
      
Beer cross-price -0.988 -0.886 -0.952 0.640 0.426 
 (0.233)*** (0.249)*** (0.281)*** (0.826) (0.318) 
      
Wine (still) cross-price 0.0384 -0.0314 -0.128 -0.159 -0.0519 
 (0.0964) (0.103) (0.115) (0.364) (0.138) 
      
Other wine own-price -0.321 -0.350 -0.340 0.0156 -0.00857 
 (0.0722)*** (0.0773)*** (0.0882)*** (0.284) (0.110) 
      
Spirit cross-price -1.650 -1.683 -1.460 -0.0696 -0.0638 
 (0.130)*** (0.140)*** (0.159)*** (0.534) (0.209) 
      
Soft Drinks cross-price -0.155 -0.268 -0.276 -0.194 -0.244 
 (0.256) (0.274) (0.310) (0.929) (0.353) 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 199,195 178,421 138,418 31,375 27,418 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 13,808 11,614 7,965 1,001 889 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. 
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Table 18: Spanish Other wine Price elasticities by drinking behaviour and income group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Light Medium Heavy IncQ1 IncQ2 IncQ3 IncQ4 
        
Beer cross-price -0.681 -0.913 -0.524 -0.991 0.171 -1.995 -1.003 
 (0.263)** (0.971) (0.743) (0.554) (0.476) (0.441)*** (0.442)* 
        
Wine (still) cross-price 0.0865 -0.156 0.256 -0.216 -0.161 0.221 0.256 
 (0.109) (0.396) (0.303) (0.238) (0.193) (0.185) (0.180) 
        
Other wine own-price -0.352 -0.0211 -0.294 -0.212 -0.436 -0.271 -0.346 
 (0.0808)*** (0.303) (0.241) (0.180) (0.146)** (0.138)* (0.133)** 
        
Spirit cross-price -1.552 -1.735 -0.900 -0.540 -1.641 -1.843 -2.130 
 (0.145)*** (0.555)** (0.466) (0.316) (0.273)*** (0.250)*** (0.238)*** 
        
Soft Drinks cross-price -0.388 0.783 -1.445 0.714 -0.322 -0.685 -0.342 
 (0.289) (1.064) (0.797) (0.614) (0.529) (0.482) (0.476) 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 175,740 15,972 7,483 49,987 50,043 49,706 49,459 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 10,146 2,381 1,281 2,361 3,218 3,817 4,412 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. 
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Table 19: Uncompensated price elasticities and income elasticities for Spain 
  Beer   Wine (still)   Other Wine   Spirits   Soft Drinks   
Beer -1.339  
 
0.001  
 
-0.069  
 
0.084  
 
0.492    
 
(0.102) *** (0.053) 
 
(0.031) ** (0.049) * (0.085) *** 
Wine (still) -0.028  
 
-0.708  
 
0.062  
 
-0.023  
 
-0.231    
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.052) *** (0.019) *** (0.027) 
 
(0.046) *** 
Other Wine -0.770  
 
0.458  
 
-0.649  
 
-0.126  
 
-0.250    
 
(0.279) *** (0.178) ** (0.150) *** (0.170) 
 
(0.274)   
Spirits 0.064  
 
-0.378  
 
-0.076  
 
-1.923  
 
0.545    
 
(0.206) 
 
(0.124) *** (0.080) 
 
(0.173) *** (0.225) ** 
Soft Drinks 0.509  
 
-0.322  
 
-0.022  
 
0.203  
 
-1.396    
 
(0.098) *** (0.058) *** (0.036) 
 
(0.062) *** (0.136) *** 
  
         
  
Income Elasticity 0.831  *** 0.929  *** 1.337  *** 1.767  *** 1.028  ***  
 
(0.009)   (0.009)   (0.036)   (0.027)   (0.009)   
Source: Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. Remarks: Sample excludes top 5% (1%) 
consumption per adult for Beer (Wine, Other Wine, Spirits) and is restricted to households with exactly 
one Adult (i.e. aged 18 or above) and with non-zero consumption of at least one alcoholic beverage. 
Number of Observations is 14,358. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Own and cross-
price elasticities represent uncompensated elasticities; for calculation see Poi (2012). 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 
0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
5.3 French price elasticities for alcoholic beverages 
To estimate the price elasticities of beer, wine and spirits in France we use data from the French 
Household Budget Survey for the year 2010. Availability on Budget Household Survey data for France is 
quite limited compared to Spain and Poland. France only surveys households every five years and 
started providing scientific use files for consumption diaries including consumed quantities beginning 
with the year 2010. Moreover, the HBS for 2015 was not yet available for scientific use for this study, so 
our dataset for France is de facto limited to the year 2010. Another feature of the French HBS data is 
that respondents were asked to record their consumption over a period of just one week, compared to 
two weeks for Spain and one month for Poland. This results in severe under-sampling (compared to the 
economy wide recorded figures) especially of less frequent consumed but also for more frequently 
consumed goods such as alcoholic beverages. 
As a result of these data limitations, we are left with only small number of observations compared to 
Spain and Poland and we cannot exploit variation of prices over time, since we are restricted to the year 
2010. These restrictions call for methodological flexibility, so we depart from the use of more data 
intensive two-stage procedures or demand system estimation and revert to simple ordinary least 
squares regression analysis. As an approximation for the prices of the alcoholic beverages we employ a 
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reduced version of the approach outlined in Aepli (2014), which is also employed for Spain and Poland, 
and as an additional method apply the hedonic price adjustment discussed in Angulo et al. (2001). In the 
first approach we exploit the regional variation over 9 French NUTS1 regions (Zone d’études et 
d’aménagement du territoire) interacted with a measure of population density of the urban area 
(<10,000, <100,000 and >=100,000 inhabitants).  
In the second approach, we adjust unit values of the alcoholic beverages recorded by the individual 
households for socio-economic characteristics of the households and their members that may be heavily 
correlated with the quality of the product. In particular, regarding household characteristics we control 
for the household type (single, couple with children, …), the total household income, the number of 
economically active persons, the total expenditures, the budget share spent on restaurants and hotels, 
the OECD-scale equivalent household size. Additionally, we include as characteristics of the household 
reference person the highest level of education, nationality, gender and profession. 
Table 20 summarizes the results of the two types of regressions. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the quantity per household member aged 18 and above of the respective alcoholic 
beverage. The first column per beverage reports the results using the method of Aepli (2014) to 
construct prices from unit values, while the second column reports the hedonic price adjustment. Since 
the hedonic price adjustment can only be applied to observed unit values, the sample size for this 
method is even smaller. Within this method, including the price of other alcoholic beverages, to get an 
estimate of the cross-price elasticity, would even further reduce the sample, since then only households 
that report consumption in all four alcoholic beverage categories would be included in the sample. We 
therefore restrict this method to estimation of the own price elasticity only. Due to the small sample 
size in general, we depart from reporting additional estimates by household size, income group or 
drinking behaviour as was done for Spain and Poland. In light of the heavy restrictions imposed by the 
data availability the results seem plausible from an economic perspective and relatively robust and 
significant from a statistical view.  
The estimations result in a beer price elasticity for France of between -0.62 to -0.77. French households 
respond less to price changes for wine with elasticities of between -0.49 to -0.57. For spirits we receive a 
positive and statistically insignificant elasticity when exploiting the regional variation of the price in 
Column (5). The hedonic price adjustment, however, results in a statistically significant spirits price 
elasticity of -0.38. For other wine, which in France essentially covers sparkling wine such as champagne, 
a similar picture emerges. Exploiting the regional variation (see column (7)) results in a statistically 
insignificant, but a reasonable elasticity of -0.16. The small sample size of household reporting non-zero 
consumption of sparkling wine might be responsible for the larger standard error. When switching to 
the hedonic price method the results point towards a significant elasticity of -0.18, very similar and thus 
supportive to the result in column (7). In general, cross-price elasticity are only in one case statistically 
significant and economically relevant in terms of effect size. Wine seems to be a substitute for spirits 
with a positive and significant cross-price elasticity of 0.33, meaning that French households switch to 
wine when faced with increasing prices for spirits.  
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Table 20: French Price Elasticities, 2010 
 Beer Wine Spirits Other Wine 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Beer price -0.615*** -0.767*** -0.034  0.125  -0.054  
 (0.114) (0.043) (0.088)  (0.095)  (0.148)  
         
Wine price -0.246*  -0.490*** -0.573*** -0.005  -0.120  
 (0.121)  (0.086) (0.029) (0.094)  (0.158)  
         
Spirit price 0.201  0.327***  0.074 -0.380*** -0.129  
 (0.114)  (0.082)  (0.100) (0.042) (0.135)  
         
Other Wine price -0.059  -0.012  0.020  -0.155 -0.179*** 
 (0.067)  (0.052)  (0.054)  (0.098) (0.043) 
         
Observations 1,503 1,456 2,333 2,293 1,356 1,320 603 585 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Estimation is carried out 
via Ordinary Least Squares with robust standard errors. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) report the results 
based on prices constructed from regional median unit values (see Aepli, 2014), while columns (2), (4), 
(6) and (8) price are based on hedonically-adjusted individual unit values. Source: Own calculations 
based on French HBS 2010. 
5.4 Polish price elasticities for alcoholic beverages 
To estimate the price elasticities of beer, wine and spirits in Poland we use data from the Polish Budget 
Household Survey for the years 2006-2016. The distribution of the derived prices can be found in 
Appendix B. In the following we present the summaries of the results of the two-stage Heckman 
estimations, reporting only the second stage
30
 price and cross-price elasticities for beer, still wine, other 
wine and spirits. Similar to the analysis for Spain, we also include the price of soft drinks, since these 
drinks can be regarded as substitute or complement (for mixed drinks). A description of all variables 
included and a summary of their impacts in both stages of the decision process is given in Appendix C. 
Prior to the estimations we discarded households with more than five members aged 18 and above as 
well as the top and bottom 5% of observations with respect to the total quantity consumed per adult for 
each alcoholic beverage. However, contrary to Spain, this outlier cleaning procedure discards a much 
larger portion of households at the lowest income quartile than in the other quartiles. Due to this 
peculiarity, we decided to drop only the largest and lowest 1% of observations with respect to quantity 
consumed for the results by income group and alcoholic drinking behaviour. The dependent variable is 
the log quantity per household member aged 18 and above of the respective alcoholic beverage.  
As before for Spain, the results of the price elasticities are reported separately for each alcoholic 
beverage group (beer, wine still, wine other and spirits) per household size, income group and drinking 
behaviour. Table 21 reports the beer price elasticities for Polish households by household size. Contrary 
to Spain, the size of the own price elasticity is stable at around -0.43 to -0.48 and are highly significant 
throughout. Other wines and soft drinks are substitutes, whereas beer consumption reacts more to 
price changes in soft drinks than in other wines. Table 22 shows the price elasticities by drinking 
behaviour and income quartile. The consumption of light drinkers (-0.62) seem to be less responsive to 
beer price than that of medium (-1.65) drinkers, with heavy drinkers being most unresponsive with a 
                                                                
30
 Detailed estimation results for the first (decision to buy) and second (decision on quantity) are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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statistically insignificant elasticity of -0.4. Light drinkers regard beer as a substitute for other wines and 
soft drinks as substitutes and as a complement for spirits, while for medium drinkers beer acts as 
substitute when faced with increasing still wine and other wine prices. The results by income group 
suggest the lowest demand sensitivity for the poorest quartile, the highest for the second and then a 
monotonically decreasing responsiveness. 
The price elasticities of still wine by household size are given in Table 23. We find a statistically 
significant own price elasticity of still wine of between -0.11 and -0.16. For the samples including 
households with 2 or more adults, columns (1) to (3), we find a statistically significant cross-price 
elasticity of soft drinks of between 0.15 and 0.2, which suggests that wine acts as a substitute for soft 
drinks. Table 24 shows the still wine elasticities by drinking behaviour and income group. Statistically 
significant own-price and cross-price elasticities are only found for light drinkers. Contrary to Spain, the 
price elasticity of wine does not decrease by income but rather the opposite. The results suggest 
monotonically increasing price responsiveness from -0.11 to -0.19.  
Results for elasticities by household size for spirits in Poland are given in Table 25. The own-price 
elasticities of spirits for households with 3 and more adults are positive and statistically insignificant. 
Restricting the sample further to households with less than 3 adults results in negative elasticities but 
they stay insignificant. While this result does not suggest that Polish households consume more spirits 
given price increases, it does suggest that consumers in Poland have a very low price responsiveness 
regarding spirits. Table 26 shows the results by drinking behaviour and income group. Except for 
medium drinkers, all own-price elasticities for spirits are negative but statistically significant.  
A summary of the results of elasticities for other wines by household size is given in Table 27. As with 
spirits, the results point towards positive own-price elasticities of very small magnitude and with very 
large standard errors. The results essentially stay the same when dividing the sample by drinking 
behaviour or income group (see Table 28).  
The price elasticities of soft drinks for Polish households are given in Table 50 and Table 51 in Appendix 
D. The cross-price elasticities of soft drinks with respect to beer are very large, between 0.62 and 0.85, 
indicating a strong substitutive relationship between beer and soft drinks. Polish Households also 
substitute other wine and spirits for soft drinks but to a much lesser degree. Moreover, the strong 
substitutive behaviour seems to be present only for light, and for beer also moderate, drinking 
households but is present for households of each income group.   
Finally, the results of the full demand system are summarized in Table 29. The own-price elasticities are 
-0.5 for beer, -0.94 for wine, -1.79 for other wine and -0.88 for spirits. Contrary to the findings of the 
beverage-by-beverage two-step regressions, the QAIDS estimation results in a sizeable negative and 
statistically significant ow-price elasticity for spirits. The beer price elasticity is in line with the tow-stage 
estimates, while price changes in wine and other wine respond in much larger changes in consumption 
patterns according to the estimates of the demand system. Income elasticities are 0.58 for beer, 1.17 for 
wine, 0.84 for other wine and 1.69 for spirits. Thus, wealthier Polish households spent relatively more 
on wine and spirits. Concerning the cross-price elasticities, we again only discuss elasticities above a 
certain threshold in size. A one percent increase in the price of wine lowers beer consumption but 
increases soft drink consumption by a quarter percent. An increase in other wine of one percent 
increases beer consumption by 1.27 percent and soft drinks by above a quarter percent but reduces 
wine consumption by 0.82 percent. Raising spirits prices by one percent reduces consumption of beer by 
0.6 percent. Increasing soft drink prices by a percent decreases beer but increases wine consumption by 
a quarter percent.  
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Table 21: Polish Beer Price elasticities by Household Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All up to 3 Adults up to 2 Adults one Adult Single HH 
      
Beer own-price -0.476 -0.467 -0.426 -0.437 -0.432 
 (0.0607)
***
 (0.0647)
***
 (0.0741)
***
 (0.155)
**
 (0.164)
**
 
      
Wine cross-price -0.0356 -0.0368 -0.0141 -0.0189 -0.0140 
 (0.0172)
*
 (0.0184)
*
 (0.0210) (0.0440) (0.0465) 
      
Other wine cross-price 0.0649 0.0578 0.0479 0.0166 0.0168 
 (0.00604)
***
 (0.00646)
***
 (0.00744)
***
 (0.0153) (0.0162) 
      
Spirit cross-price -0.333 -0.335 -0.365 -0.0835 -0.0586 
 (0.0434)
***
 (0.0461)
***
 (0.0526)
***
 (0.109) (0.116) 
      
Soft drink cross-price 0.206 0.164 0.137 0.0618 0.0644 
 (0.0185)
***
 (0.0198)
***
 (0.0228)
***
 (0.0481) (0.0508) 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 313,376 277,181 218,316 53,659 46,288 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 170,710 150,049 117,259 22,128 19,745 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. 
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Table 22: Polish Beer Price elasticities by drinking behaviour and income group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Light Medium Heavy IncQ1 IncQ2 IncQ3 IncQ4 
        
Beer own-price -0.617 -1.647 -0.398 -0.387 -1.076 -0.936 -0.657 
 (0.0646)*** (0.288)*** (0.867) (0.152)* (0.131)*** (0.125)*** (0.120)*** 
        
Wine (still) cross-price -0.0115 0.309 0.119 -0.110 0.0701 -0.0874 -0.0924 
 (0.0183) (0.0797)*** (0.244) (0.0428)* (0.0370) (0.0351)* (0.0342)** 
        
Other wine cross-price 0.0796 0.0803 0.0441 0.0955 0.0922 0.0699 0.0563 
 (0.00643)*** (0.0291)** (0.0899) (0.0152)*** (0.0131)*** (0.0123)*** (0.0120)*** 
        
Spirit cross-price -0.325 -0.504 -0.305 -0.0367 -0.352 -0.407 -0.514 
 (0.0462)*** (0.198)* (0.601) (0.112) (0.0952)*** (0.0876)*** (0.0841)*** 
        
Soft Drinks cross-price 0.227 0.0556 0.124 0.379 0.337 0.291 0.215 
 (0.0196)*** (0.0910) (0.280) (0.0451)*** (0.0391)*** (0.0374)*** (0.0382)*** 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 314,245 8,583 1,248 68,124 81,131 85,871 88,950 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 172,670 7,670 1,070 29,789 42,982 50,805 57,834 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 1% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. 
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Table 23: Polish Wine (still) Price elasticities by Household Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All up to 3 Adults up to 2 Adults one Adult Single HH 
      
Beer cross-price 0.0410 0.0297 -0.00916 -0.234 -0.274 
 (0.0683) (0.0704) (0.0746) (0.124) (0.132)* 
      
Wine (still) own-price -0.149 -0.161 -0.148 -0.113 -0.108 
 (0.0192)*** (0.0198)*** (0.0210)*** (0.0355)** (0.0376)** 
      
Other wine cross-price 0.00356 0.00235 -0.00443 0.0123 0.0136 
 (0.00713) (0.00734) (0.00777) (0.0129) (0.0138) 
      
Spirit cross-price 0.128 0.0847 0.0366 -0.134 -0.133 
 (0.0481)** (0.0496) (0.0523) (0.0878) (0.0930) 
      
Soft drink cross-price 0.200 0.191 0.154 0.0726 0.0752 
 (0.0215)*** (0.0223)*** (0.0237)*** (0.0403) (0.0427) 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 332,454 294,851 230,768 57,030 49,439 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 54,629 50,987 40,640 8,681 7,711 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. 
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Table 24: Polish Wine (still) Price elasticities by drinking behaviour and income group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Light Medium Heavy IncQ1 IncQ2 IncQ3 IncQ4 
        
Beer cross-price 0.0149 0.516 -0.319 -0.0688 -0.253 -0.137 0.187 
 (0.0760) (0.351) (0.782) (0.191) (0.151) (0.141) (0.131) 
        
Wine (still) own-price -0.114 -0.119 0.0371 -0.114 -0.126 -0.135 -0.186 
 (0.0214)*** (0.0975) (0.225) (0.0538)* (0.0426)** (0.0391)*** (0.0367)*** 
        
Other wine cross-price 0.00589 0.00833 0.0568 0.0536 0.0131 0.0266 -0.0187 
 (0.00793) (0.0358) (0.0848) (0.0206)** (0.0160) (0.0145) (0.0135) 
        
Spirit cross-price 0.133 0.156 -0.591 -0.0530 0.106 0.130 0.117 
 (0.0537)* (0.245) (0.524) (0.141) (0.109) (0.0982) (0.0906) 
        
Soft Drinks cross-price 0.252 0.0671 -0.0201 0.157 0.274 0.282 0.323 
 (0.0239)*** (0.113) (0.255) (0.0582)** (0.0463)*** (0.0433)*** (0.0427)*** 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 325,626 9,478 1,933 70,594 84,540 89,726 92,177 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 53,935 4,410 867 6,436 11,151 16,120 25,505 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 1% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. 
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Table 25: Polish Spirit Price elasticities by Household Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All up to 3 Adults up to 2 Adults one Adult Single HH 
      
Beer cross-price 0.128 0.136 0.0975 -0.0644 -0.0726 
 (0.0596)* (0.0612)* (0.0659) (0.134) (0.140) 
      
Wine (still) cross-price -0.144 -0.143 -0.102 -0.0398 -0.0343 
 (0.0169)*** (0.0173)*** (0.0187)*** (0.0383) (0.0401) 
      
Other wine cross-price -0.0108 -0.0150 -0.0204 -0.0246 -0.0290 
 (0.00614) (0.00632)* (0.00683)** (0.0135) (0.0141)* 
      
Spirit own-price 0.0522 0.0211 -0.0323 -0.150 -0.0637 
 (0.0433) (0.0444) (0.0476) (0.0954) (0.0997) 
      
Soft drink cross-price 0.175 0.129 0.0679 0.0345 0.0149 
 (0.0185)*** (0.0192)*** (0.0208)** (0.0426) (0.0446) 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 326,750 288,618 225,910 55,949 48,343 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 84,509 74,134 56,923 10,531 9,611 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. 
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Table 26: Polish Spirit Price elasticities by drinking behaviour and income group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Light Medium Heavy IncQ1 IncQ2 IncQ3 IncQ4 
        
Beer cross-price 0.258 0.648 1.195 0.109 0.0670 0.184 0.191 
 (0.0629)*** (0.202)** (0.587)* (0.176) (0.136) (0.125) (0.118) 
        
Wine (still) cross-price -0.134 -0.136 -0.0479 -0.0595 -0.169 -0.211 -0.235 
 (0.0178)*** (0.0558)* (0.167) (0.0504) (0.0387)*** (0.0352)*** (0.0331)*** 
        
Other wine cross-price -0.00901 -0.0900 0.0439 0.00629 0.00721 -0.0139 -0.0264 
 (0.00649) (0.0204)*** (0.0640) (0.0182) (0.0143) (0.0127) (0.0120)* 
        
Spirit own-price -0.0375 0.252 -0.0940 -0.193 -0.0259 -0.121 -0.0839 
 (0.0458) (0.138) (0.398) (0.130) (0.101) (0.0901) (0.0836) 
        
Soft Drinks cross-price 0.115 0.0135 -0.246 0.0933 0.174 0.186 0.311 
 (0.0196)*** (0.0639) (0.186) (0.0528) (0.0414)*** (0.0386)*** (0.0379)*** 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 322,816 9,479 1,283 70,085 83,609 88,636 91,248 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 82,177 8,103 1,057 11,196 19,645 26,284 34,212 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 1% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. 
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Table 27: Polish Other Wine Price elasticities by Household Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All up to 3 Adults up to 2 Adults one Adult Single HH 
      
Beer cross-price -0.323 -0.357 -0.354 -0.366 -0.329 
 (0.108)** (0.107)*** (0.111)** (0.187)* (0.207) 
      
Wine (still) cross-price -0.0264 -0.0368 -0.0114 -0.111 -0.112 
 (0.0351) (0.0349) (0.0358) (0.0649) (0.0705) 
      
Other wine cross-price 0.00387 0.00194 -0.0193 0.0128 0.00126 
 (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0157) (0.0261) (0.0281) 
      
Spirit cross-price 0.198 0.145 0.196 0.373 0.466 
 (0.0926)* (0.0920) (0.0949)* (0.160)* (0.176)** 
      
Soft drink cross-price 0.180 0.168 0.110 0.0402 0.0275 
 (0.0353)*** (0.0353)*** (0.0368)** (0.0635) (0.0705) 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 340,130 300,071 235,146 58,428 50,717 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 13,859 12,150 9,305 1,496 1,245 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. 
  
 
 IHS – Price elasticity and implied tax revenue effects for alcoholic beverages - 59 
 
Table 28: Polish Other Wine Price elasticities by drinking behaviour and income group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Light Medium Heavy IncQ1 IncQ2 IncQ3 IncQ4 
        
Beer cross-price -0.272 -0.788 2.108 -0.587 -0.431 -0.173 -0.157 
 (0.124)* (0.512) (2.217) (0.292)* (0.241) (0.233) (0.222) 
        
Wine (still) cross-price -0.101 -0.194 -0.182 0.0363 -0.235 -0.0989 -0.139 
 (0.0406)* (0.156) (0.709) (0.0999) (0.0826)** (0.0750) (0.0684)* 
        
Other wine own-price -0.00847 0.0997 -0.221 -0.0445 -0.00288 0.0475 -0.0316 
 (0.0179) (0.0681) (0.304) (0.0482) (0.0396) (0.0326) (0.0285) 
        
Spirit cross-price 0.469 0.234 1.824 0.558 0.637 0.187 0.417 
 (0.108)*** (0.416) (1.704) (0.270)* (0.219)** (0.198) (0.181)* 
        
Soft Drinks cross-price 0.217 0.0852 -0.749 0.194 0.196 0.227 0.223 
 (0.0407)*** (0.169) (0.718) (0.0949)* (0.0791)* (0.0745)** (0.0736)** 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 329,072 9,961 2,173 71,100 85,243 90,847 94,016 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 13,699 1,007 229 2,068 3,385 4,240 5,242 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 1% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in litre per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. 
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Table 29: Uncompensated price elasticities and income elasticities for Poland 
  Beer   Wine (still)   Other Wine   Spirits   Soft Drinks   
Beer -0.498  
 
-0.010  
 
0.077  
 
-0.113  
 
-0.034    
 
(0.068) *** (0.030) 
 
(0.011) *** (0.056) ** (0.030)   
Wine (still) -0.268  
 
-0.943  
 
-0.121  
 
-0.126  
 
0.280    
 
(0.076) *** (0.078) *** (0.019) *** (0.072) * (0.052) *** 
Other Wine 1.270  
 
-0.823  
 
-1.786  
 
0.202  
 
0.293    
 
(0.200) *** (0.141) *** (0.068) *** (0.189) 
 
(0.137) ** 
Spirits -0.602  
 
-0.184  
 
-0.001  
 
-0.882  
 
-0.023    
 
(0.101) *** (0.052) *** (0.019) 
 
(0.106) *** (0.049)   
Soft Drinks -0.230  
 
0.232  
 
0.025  
 
0.151  
 
-1.141    
 
(0.052) *** (0.036) *** (0.013) * (0.047) *** (0.048) *** 
  
         
  
Income Elasticity 0.577  *** 1.177  *** 0.843  *** 1.691  *** 0.964  ***  
 
(0.004)   (0.009)   (0.031)   (0.007)   (0.006)   
Source: Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. Remarks: Sample excludes top 5% (1%) 
consumption per adult for Beer (Wine, Other Wine, Spirits) and is restricted to households with exactly 
one Adult (i.e. aged 18 or above) and with non-zero consumption of at least one alcoholic beverage. 
Number of Observations is 32,448. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Own and cross-
price elasticities represent uncompensated elasticities; for calculation see Poi (2012). 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 
0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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6 Tax Revenue Simulations 
6.1 Direct estimation with macro data 
The direct estimation of a revenue effect of a change in the excise tax implies that the demand 
elasticities estimated in the previous subsection need to be implicitly accounted for. The relationship 
between the price elasticity of demand and the total revenues has been discussed in various contexts. In 
microeconomics, the total revenue test of the demand elasticity uses the change in total (sales) 
revenues to identify whether the price elasticity of demand is elastic or inelastic. In public economics 
the well-known concept of the Laffer curve discusses the non-linear relationship between the tax rates 
and tax revenues.
31
 These two concepts can be discussed in a common framework. In Figure 15 we 
illustrate the mechanics in the simple case of a linear demand function. The top half of Figure 15 shows 
the downward sloping demand curve. A price increase results in a drop of the sold quantity from point A 
to B. The higher price results in additional revenue for each sold unit, shown as the rectangle with the 
label ‘price effect’. At the same time the higher price also leads to a drop in the quantity sold. This effect 
is show in the rectangle with the label ‘quantity effect’. Depending on which point of the demand curve 
we are, either one of the effects can be bigger. In the case illustrated in Figure 15 we are in a price range 
where the demand is elastic. This implies that the quantity effect dominates the price effect and the 
overall revenues as shown in the lower part of Figure 15 decline as a result of the price increase.  
While the description in Figure 15 illustrates the relationship between the price elasticity and the sales 
revenues it can easily be translated into a Laffer curve setting. Laffer (2004) describes the two 
competing effects of a tax change as ‘arithmetic effect’ and ‘economic effects’. The arithmetic effect is 
closely related to the price effect while the economic effect is much like the quantity effect. The 
combination of these two effects result in the non-linear relationship between tax rate and revenues. 
The revenue maximising point is illustrated in Figure 15 as point C. At this point the price elasticity is 
exactly unity, at prices above this point the demand is elastic and at price below this point the demand 
is inelastic. The key message of the total revenue test is that if the demand is sufficiently elastic a price 
increase will not increase revenues. Converted to the that Laffer curve concept this implies that if 
demand is sufficiently elastic, a tax increase will not necessarily increase tax revenues. Additionally, one 
can imply from the simplified case of the linear demand function, that the price elasticity of demand is 
likely to be more elastic the higher the prices are. Or in other words, the higher the tax already is, the 
less likely will a further increase in tax increase the revenues.  
The simplicity of the Laffer curve is appealing. If no taxes are levied no revenues are raised. If tax 
become extremely high, nobody will legally sell any of the good and no more revenues are made. In 
between, there must be a tax rate which maximises the tax revenues.
32
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 The idea of the non-linear relationship between tax rate and revenues and a revenue maximizing tax rate dates 
much further back, but gained significant public attention when Wanniski (1978) described how the economist 
Arthur Laffer explained the concept of a revenue maximizing tax rate to Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney. See also 
Laffer (2004) for a detailed discussion about the origins of the Laffer curve.  
32
 It is important to note, that the revenue maximizing tax rate is normally not an optimal tax rate. First there are 
several other policy goals (health issues, redistribution, stability of employment, etc.) one may want to achieve with 
taxation. Furthermore, the Laffer curve concept only maximizes revenues of the own tax and does not account for 
spillover effects on other taxes (e.g. VAT). See for example Diamond and Saez (2011) for a broader discussion of 
optimal taxes.  
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Figure 15: Price elasticity and revenues, mechanics of a Laffer curve 
 
Source: own illustration 
While there is no dispute about these basic facts, the exact shape of the Laffer curve is unknown. Absent 
any further information, the simplest way to estimate a Laffer curve is to regress the revenues on the 
corresponding tax rate and a quadratic term of the tax rate. There are several limitations to the 
application of the Laffer curve idea to the excise taxation of alcoholic beverages. First, the concept of no 
revenues at a prohibitively high tax rate does not necessarily hold for a specific tax. In contrast to a case 
of a 100% income tax rate where any incentive of report income vanishes it is likely that even at very 
high excise tax rates some consumption will take place. Second, the estimation of a Laffer curve is 
always necessarily based on past observations. Therefore, there remain some doubts about the validity 
for later periods. Additionally, difficulties may arise in the estimation of a Laffer curve if there are only 
few or no observations with very high tax rates. In this case it can be still possible to identify a revenue 
maximising tax rate, but the empirical backing is only limited. Overall, the use of a quadratic relationship 
between tax rates and revenues is certainly only a crude approximation to the exact empirical 
 
 IHS – Price elasticity and implied tax revenue effects for alcoholic beverages - 63 
 
relationship between the level of taxation and the corresponding tax revenues. That said, it provides 
easy to interpret results and gives a general idea about the limitations of the tax.  
To further reduce the impact of confounding factors we control for all time invariant country 
characteristics by including country fixed effects. Similarly, we account for general time trends by 
including year dummies. To further control for general income and growth effects we also include the 
(logarithm of) nominal GDP in the regression. The resulting regression equation is  
(3) log(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽1𝜏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝜏𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 log(GDP𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
In line with the discussion in Section 3 we define the tax rate 𝜏𝑖𝑡 as the Euro amount per liter of finished 
product in country 𝑖. The results in Table 30 show the estimates for the overall sample of 28 countries 
and the time period between 1994 and 2017.
33
 For all three types of alcoholic beverages – beer, wine 
and spirits – the coefficient for the tax rate is highly significant positive and the coefficient for the 
squared tax rate highly significant negative. Thus, the estimates clearly confirm a Laffer-curve-like 
relationship between the tax rates and revenues for alcohol excise taxation.  
Table 30: Estimates of excise tax revenues from alcoholic beverages based on macro data 
  Excise tax revenues from  
  Beer excise taxes Wine excise taxes Spirits excise taxes 
Tax per litre finished productt 
4.516
***
 0.803
***
 0.115
***
 
(0.188)
    
 (0.219)
    
 (0.014)
    
 
Tax per litre finished productt
2
 
-1.778
*** 
 -0.080
**  
 -0.003
*** 
 
(0.095)
    
 (0.033)
    
 (0.001)
    
 
Log(GDPt) 
0.344
*** 
 0.694
*** 
 0.797
***    
 
(0.059)
    
 (0.187)
    
 (0.066)
    
 
Country fixed-effects   
Year dummies   
No. Observations 525
    
 264
    
 524
    
 
within R
2
 0.688
    
 0.439
    
 0.531
    
 
Implied revenue maximizing tax rate 
1.270
***
  4.992
***
 21.712
***
 
(0.031)    (0.860)     (2.336)    
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the excise tax revenue. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in 
brackets. 
***
,
**
,
* 
denotes significance
 
at the 1, 5 respectively 10% level. 
Source: own calculations based on data from the European Commission.  
The lower part of Table 30 includes the implied revenue maximizing tax rates. In line with the observed 
values of taxation the revenue maximizing rate is highest for spirits with a rate of 21.71 Euro per liter of 
finished product. The estimated revenue maximizing rate for wine lies at 4.99 Euro per liter, while the 
one for beer is at 1.27 Euro per liter. These implied revenue-maximizing tax rates are referring to a more 
than 20-year period for 28 European countries and therefore are not applicable for each country 
individually. To get a better idea about the empirical support of the hump-shaped relationship between 
tax rates and revenues Figure 16 plots the implied Laffer curves against the observed tax rates for the 
whole data sample.  
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 For wine, we can only use the information of the 16 countries with a positive excise tax rate on wine.  
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Figure 16: Comparison estimated Laffer curves and observed tax rates 
 
Source: own illustration, based on the results from Table 30 
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A few things are visible in Figure 16. First, a majority of countries do not levy (a relevant amount of) 
excise tax on wine. For beer the low excise taxes are also much more common than for spirits. In 
addition to be generally at a much higher level, excise tax rates for spirits are also more dispersed. The 
red lines in Figure 16 superimpose the estimated Laffer curves on the histograms. For beer and spirits, 
we see that some observed excise tax burdens are higher than the revenue maximizing tax rates. In 
contrast, for wine all of the observed excise tax rates are below the estimated revenue maximizing rate. 
It should be recalled, that the estimates for the revenue maximizing tax rates are for all countries and 
the time period 1994 to 2017. They are therefore only a broad approximation for the revenue effects of 
a tax rate change in the individual countries. For example, if one restricts the sample period to 2005 to 
2016 the implied revenue maximizing tax rate for beer increases slightly to 1.36 Euro, for wine it 
decreases slightly to 4.58 Euro, while for spirits it significantly drops to 15.99 Euro. What remains 
unchanged, however, is the fact that there is clear evidence for a non-linear relationship between tax 
rates and revenues. In other words, the data supports the claim that substantially higher tax rates will 
eventually not lead to even more tax revenues. 
To estimate the impact of a tax rate change in an individual country, one needs to set up a model to 
control for the development of the market of the respective alcoholic beverage. In contrast to the 
estimation for the EU as a whole it is not possible to control for confounding factors through country or 
time fixed effects. To still be able to control for a trend in the market volume, we include the one-year 
lagged tax revenue and a linear trend (𝑇) in the country specific regressions. Income effects are 
controlled by including the change in nominal GDP. This results in the following regression equations for 
each country and drinks: 
 (4) log(𝑅𝑡) = 𝛽1𝜏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝜏𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3 ∆ GDP𝑡 + 𝛽4 log(𝑅𝑡−1) + 𝑇 + 𝜀𝑡. 
Rather than presenting the regression results for each of the alcoholic beverage in tables, we combine 
the results in Figure 17. For each of the three countries France, Poland, and Spain and for each for the 
three main alcoholic beverages we plot the development of the excise tax revenues over the last 20 
years against the predicted tax revenues. The top row in Figure 17 compares the development of the 
beer excise tax revenues. A notable increase in the tax revenues in France in 2013 can clearly be linked 
to the increase in excise taxation. This sharp increase brings the beer excise tax revenues in France 
roughly up to the level of Poland.
34
 In contrast, in Spain the excise tax revenues from beer have 
developed much steadier and at a clearly lower level. The middle part of Figure 17 shows the 
development of wine excise tax revenues. Both for France and for Poland the excise tax revenues have 
been declining, while Spain does not levy a wine excise tax. In contrast, the lower part of Figure 17 
shows that the tax revenues from excise taxes on spirits are increasing in all three countries.  
The graphs in Figure 17 plot the observed tax revenues in red against the predicted revenues in light 
blue. The prediction is extrapolated up to 2020. The dashed light blue lines additionally indicate a 
confidence interval of the prediction by showing plus/minus one standard deviation. By and large the 
predictions are most precise for Spain and least precise for Poland. Additionally, the dark blue line 
indicates an alternative prediction with the excise tax rate increased by 1 % yearly.  
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 It is worth noting, that this absolute comparison does not take into account differences in country size and 
consumption patterns. Therefore, the differences in tax revenues may not directly be interpreted in differences in 
tax burden.  
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Figure 17: Comparison observed and predicted excise tax revenues, incl. prediction to 2020  
 
Source: own illustration, based on the results from regression (4), data from European Commission. 
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The implied changes in tax revenues in the first year of a 1 % increase in the excise tax rates are also 
collected in Table 31. A one percent increase in excise tax for spirits appears to lower tax revenues in all 
three countries. In contrast, for beer and wine an excise tax rate increase implies an increase in tax 
revenues. However, the estimates are not precise. For all estimates, the reported confidence interval 
plus/minus 1 standard deviation include both positive and negative values. Therefore, the results from 
this macro estimates should be taken with caution.  
Table 31: Predicted excise tax revenues changes from alcoholic beverages based on macro data 
Source: Based on the results from regression (4), data from European Commission 
The imprecise nature of the results in The implied changes in tax revenues in the first year of a 1 % 
increase in the excise tax rates are also collected in Table 31. A one percent increase in excise tax for 
spirits appears to lower tax revenues in all three countries. In contrast, for beer and wine an excise tax 
rate increase implies an increase in tax revenues. However, the estimates are not precise. For all 
estimates, the reported confidence interval plus/minus 1 standard deviation include both positive and 
negative values. Therefore, the results from this macro estimates should be taken with caution.  
Table 31 aside, there are also other shortcomings of the direct estimation approach. First the direct 
estimation does not present the intermediate result of changes in volume sold and furthermore it does 
not distinguish between the on and off trade sales. This in consequence also rules out to estimate an 
additional impact on VAT revenues. To overcome these limitations the next section uses a simulation 
approach to model the revenue impact of excise tax changes. 
6.2 Simulation approach 
The simulation approach starts from observed data about tax rates, volumes sold, prices, tax revenues 
and other macroeconomic development indicators. These inputs are combined in a model with 
assumptions about the relationship between the observed quantities. This model is then used to derive 
a path of future development of prices, volumes and tax revenues. Against these benchmark paths we 
can then evaluate the implied changes in response to an excise tax rate change.  In the following we 
briefly describe the input, structure and assumptions which form the model for the tax revenue 
simulation. 
6.2.1 Input  
The first set of input variables includes the tax rates and tax revenues for the different alcoholic 
beverages. Together with the volume and the value of the respective market these variables provide the 
outset for our simulation model. Table 32 reports the values for 2017 which is the latest available year 
with full data coverage.  
The second set of input variables includes other general macroeconomic variables which affect the 
consumption of alcoholic beverages. There are numerous aspects affecting the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages, but for most of them there are either no reliable data or no well-established prior knowledge 
  Beer Wine Spirits 
  -1 std. estimate + 1 std. -1 std. estimate + 1 std. -1 std. estimate + 1 std. 
Poland -2,54% 0,24% 3,09% -3,78% 0,22% 4,39% -3,54% -0,22% 3,22% 
Spain -2,69% 0,02% 2,81%    -2,32% -0,41% 1,54% 
France -1,85% 1,32% 4,59% -0,55% 1,12% 2,81% -2,42% -0,70% 1,04% 
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regarding size of the influence available.
35
 Therefore, we restrict the number of general macroeconomic 
variables to two main channels: first, the general income situation, which we measure through the 
growth rate in nominal GDP, and second the change in demographics, which we measure as the change 
in adult population. Additionally, we include the general increase in consumer prices in the model. 
Controlling for overall inflation is relevant to distinguish the increase in income from an increase in 
purchasing power. Additionally, the general increases in prices also imply higher VAT revenues. Table 33 
collects the information about the macroeconomic trends together with the information about the VAT 
rates.  
Table 32: Inputs simulation model: tax rates and revenues, volumes and prices (2017) 
  France Poland Spain 
Tax revenues 2017 (in Mio. €) 
Beer 892 829 345 
Wine 89 92 0 
Spirits 2,234 1,879 842 
Tax rates 2017 (in €/hl of pure alcohol) 
Beer 741 454 199 
Wine 34 335 0 
Spirits 2,295 1,329 959 
Total volumes sold 2017 (in 1,000 hl) 
Beer 22,295 36,620 36,039 
Wine 26,227 2,176 9,132 
Spirits 3,401 2,799 1,867 
Average retail off trade prices for finished product, incl. VAT (2017) 
Beer 3.04 1.26 1.77 
Wine 5.89 4.70 4.66 
Spirits 18.11 10.96 15.43 
Note: Average prices are derived by dividing reported sales volume by the reported quantity sold.  
Source: European Commission, IWSR. 
Table 33: Inputs the simulation model: macroeconomic trends, VAT rates (2017) 
  France Poland Spain 
Macroeconomic trends (yearly growth rates in %) 
Change in adult population 0.50 0.00 0.30 
Change in nominal GDP 2.88 4.93 3.93 
Change in consumer prices 1.03 2.08 1.96 
Value added tax for alcoholic beverages (in %) 
VAT rate off trade 20 23 21 
VAT rate on trade 20 23 10 
Note: The change in nominal GDP is for 2018.  
Source: World Development Indicators, European Commission. 
In addition to the readily available input variables, further input variables are specifically derived for the 
model. These calculations already require a set of assumptions. Therefore, we discuss them together 
with the underlying assumptions and the structure of our simulation model in the next subsection.  
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 Aspects that suffer from data availability or lack prior knowledge regarding their impact include for 
example, the impact of legal restrictions such as bans on advertisement or changes in legal limits for 
driving.  
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6.2.2 Assumptions and structure of the model 
The first set of assumption collected in Table 34 is concerned with the general trend of the sales 
volumes in the markets. To get an estimate for the general development of the sales volume we ran 
linear regressions on the market volumes controlling for the tax rate, the change in adult population and 
the change in nominal GDP. The resulting coefficient for the linear trend is then used as an input for the 
model. A quick inspection shows that there is significant variation in the development of the different 
markets. In Poland all three markets for alcoholic beverages are trending downwards, while beer 
markets in France and Spain show a moderate growth path. The most pronounced downward trends 
can be observed for the wine markets in Spain and France and for the markets for spirits in Poland and 
Spain. Failure to account for these general trends in the market would attribute too much of the 
changes in aggregate demand to the tax changes.  
The middle part of Table 34 contains the derived assumptions about the split between the on-trade and 
off-trade channel. Two things stand out. First, for wine the share of on-trade is generally lower and 
second, for Spain the on-trade sector is generally higher.  
Table 34: Inputs simulation model: assumptions about trend and split between distribution channels 
  France Poland Spain 
Trend in overall sales volume (in %) 
Beer 1.09 -0.41 0.79 
Wine -1.94 -0.74 -2.41 
Spirits -0.15 -2.17 -4.58 
Share of on-trade sales 2016 (in %) 
Beer 34.57 36.27 63.77 
Wine 17.57 9.09 36.12 
Spirits 25.39 31.23 68.69 
Mark up for on trade sales (in %) 
Beer 237.56 237.56
a
 193.79 
Wine 225.10 301.05 149.15 
Spirits 657.47 571.26 436.89 
Note: The assumption about the trend is derived from a linear regression, while the assumptions about the split 
between the on- and off-trade channel are derived from IWSR data. Assumptions about the mark-ups are 
derived from Nielsen data. 
a 
For Poland, no information about the mark-up for beer in the on trade was 
available, therefore we use the mark-ups of France.  
Source: Own calculations, based on data from European Commission, IWSR and Nielsen. 
The lower part of Table 34 shows the derived assumptions about the mark up on the price in the on-
trade sector. Again, two main observations can be made. First, for spirits the mark up in the on-trade 
sector is much higher and second, for Spain the mark-up in the on-trade sector is general lower. Since 
we allow the general income level to have an impact on the consumption of alcohol, we need a set of 
assumptions on the income elasticity of the alcoholic beverages. In Table 35 we report the assumptions 
that were derived from a regression model. Specifically, we ran a regression on the full sample of 
European countries to receive an overall estimate for the average income elasticity for each alcoholic 
beverage. In a second step we adjust for a country specific factor. Moreover, we make the assumption 
that off-trade consumption is only 0.6 times as responsive to income changes. Overall, this results in a 
stronger income elasticity for beer, a moderate one for wine and lower one for spirits.  
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Table 35: Inputs simulation model: assumptions about income elasticity on- and off-trade channels 
  France Poland Spain 
Income elasticity on-trade 
Beer 0.55 0.57 0.55 
Wine 0.31 0.26 0.28 
Spirits 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Income elasticity off-trade 
Beer 0.33 0.34 0.33 
Wine 0.19 0.16 0.17 
Spirits 0.10 0.11 0.11 
Note: Based on regressions, off trade income elasticity is assumed to be only 60% of on-trade elasticity.  
Source: Own calculations. 
The next set of necessary assumptions relates to the price pass-through of the excise taxes. Following 
the discussion in section 4 we use the values collected in Table 10. This implies that tax changes are by 
and large fully and immediately passed onto end consumer prices, with the slight exception of beer 
where the tax pass-through is slightly below unity.  
The key assumptions for the tax revenue simulation are those made about the price elasticities of 
demand. Following the estimations in section 5 we have a number of options regarding these 
assumptions. While we have only one estimate for France, for Spain and Poland we have two sets of 
elasticities estimates. Since there is clear cut answer to the question which estimates are preferable we 
use the average between the two-stage selection and uncompensated QAIDS elasticities. For the 
estimates on the samples with different household sizes, we use the estimate for a household with up 
two adults. This choice is motivated by a trade-off between large sample size and approximating 
individual demand choices. 
Additionally, we have to make assumptions about the price elasticities for on-trade consumption. Since 
we are not able to estimate these elasticities from our datasets, we have to obtain these elasticities 
from other sources. Based on the results in Sousa (2014) we assume that the elasticity for the on-trade 
consumption is 1.2 times higher than the corresponding off-trade elasticities for wine and spirits and 
only 0.8 times the off-trade elasticities for beer. The resulting price elasticities are collected in Table 36. 
The price elasticities are highest for spirits in Spain. Moreover, the own price elasticities are generally 
much higher than the cross-price elasticities which can be seen as a plausibility check.  
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Table 36: Inputs simulation model: Assumptions on own and cross price elasticities  
  France Poland Spain 
Own price elasticity on trade 
Beer -0.61 -0.37 -0.93 
Wine -0.69 -0.65 -0.56 
Spirits -0.46 -0.55 -1.84 
Own price elasticity off trade 
Beer -0.77 -0.46 -1.17 
Wine -0.57 -0.55 -0.47 
Spirits -0.38 -0.46 -1.53 
Cross price elasticity off trade  
Beer -> Wine -0.25 -0.14 -0.15 
Beer -> Spirits 0.20 -0.48 0.01 
Wine -> Beer -0.03 -0.01 0.01 
Wine -> Spirits 0.33 -0.07 -0.47 
Spirits -> Beer 0.13 -0.01 -0.19 
Spirits -> Wine 0.01 -0.11 -0.14 
Note: Based on the estimates in section 5. On-trade elasticities are obtained by multiplying with 1.2 respectively 
0.8.  
Source: Own calculations. 
Following Occam’s razor, the main structure of the model is kept in the simplest possible form. The 
observed values of volumes prices are extrapolated with the macroeconomic trends using the 
corresponding assumptions. These include the impact of the general price inflation, the income growth 
due to increases in nominal GDP and the change in adult population. This results in a baseline 
development path of volumes sold and prices. Assuming constant mark-ups and shares in the on-trade 
sector these volumes can be split into the two distribution channels. The volumes are than multiplied 
with the corresponding tax rates which gives a benchmark development of the excise tax revenues. We 
correct this simulated excise tax revenues by the ratio of the simulated excise tax revenues to the 
observed excise tax revenues for the year 2017. This yields a no-policy change scenario which serves as 
a benchmark for the tax rate simulations. Additionally, we are able to provide a rough estimate of the 
VAT revenues by multiplying the sales volume with the corresponding VAT rates.  
To facilitate a user-friendly access to the simulation model we developed an Excel-based simulation tool. 
As can be seen in the screenshots in Figure 18 the user has two Excel spreadsheets.  
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Figure 18: Interface of simulation model 
 
 
Source: Screenshots of the Excel-based simulation tool. 
The first spreadsheet is the input page, where the user picks the country and specifies two tax rate 
scenarios for the time period 2019 to 2023. Each tax rate scenario can be defined either as a percentage 
change of the tax rate or as an absolute tax change. The lower part of the input screen displays the main 
outcomes: The resulting prices, excise taxes, market volumes, excise tax revenues and VAT revenues. 
The spreadsheet “Graphs” displays the main results graphically.  
Once the two excise tax scenarios are defined, the model in the background first selects the price pass-
through assumptions from Table 10 to derive the implied price changes. Using the constant mark-ups 
from Table 34, the price changes for the on-trade sales are calculated. Together with the own and cross-
elasticities from Table 36, the model simulates the changes on both on- and off-trade volumes sold. 
These new volumes are then used to obtain an estimate of the impact on excise tax revenues as well as 
VAT revenues.  
6.2.3 Results  
In principle, the flexibility of the simulation tool allows to find results for all kinds of combinations of tax 
rate changes. The results of a commonly requested scenario, the impacts of a 1 percent increase in each 
of the excise tax rates separately, are presented in this section to illustrate the mechanics of the 
simulation tool. 
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The top half of Table 37 shows the direct impact of the one percent increase in excise tax rates on the 
corresponding excise tax revenues. For each of the alcoholic drinks the results imply an increase in 
excise tax revenue of less than one percent. This result reflects the fact that we find a reduction in 
volumes as a reaction to a tax increase for all alcoholic beverages. Comparing the results across the 
three types of alcoholic beverages we see that the increase in revenues is close to one percent for wine, 
around 0.9 for beer and between 0.48 (Spain) and 0.77 (France) for spirits. Thus, the results suggest a 
much stronger reduction in market volume for spirits in all countries.  
Table 37: Results from simulation model: Direct revenue impact of a 1% increase in excise tax 
  France Poland Spain 
Direct excise tax revenue impact 
Beer 0.89% 0.90% 0.92% 
Wine 1.00%
a
 0.94% n.a. 
Spirits 0.77% 0.71% 0.48% 
Direct VAT revenue impact 
Beer 0.02% 0.09% -0.02% 
Wine 0.00% 0.04% n.a. 
Spirits 0.32% 0.26% -0.24% 
Source: Own calculations using the simulation tool. 
a 
0.995%. 
The lower part of Table 37 additionally shows the impact of the 1 percent increase in the excise tax on 
the VAT revenues. For beer and wine, a one percent increase in excise tax rates results in very moderate 
increase in VAT revenues. This primarily reflects the fact, that excise tax rates on these two types of 
alcoholic beverages are relatively low and therefore the corresponding increase in prices does not result 
in large VAT revenues changes. For spirits, the level of excise taxes is high enough such that a one 
percent increase in excise taxes results in sizable price changes. Hence, the impact on VAT revenues is 
also more pronounced. For France and Poland, the VAT revenues increase by roughly 0.3%. This is due 
to two factors. First, the price elasticities for spirits used in the model are much lower than these two 
countries than for Spain and the share of the on-trade sales in also smaller. In contrast, the Spanish on-
trade sector accounts for a much larger share of the market. Given the importance of the on-trade 
distribution channel and the much larger price elasticities in Spain, we find that a one percent increase 
in excise tax rates results in a loss in VAT revenues of -0.24%. This is clearly an extreme result, which rest 
on the assumption of a very high price elasticity for on-trade spirits consumption. At the same time, the 
high mark-ups in the on-trade market for spirits and the high share of the consumption which takes 
place on-trade are not very controversial assumptions. And this combination of parameters results in 
adverse VAT revenue effects if the consumption is significantly reduced following an increase in excise 
taxation.  
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Abbreviations:  
 
COICOP Classification of individual consumption by purpose 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
EHIS European Health Interview Survey 
EU European Union 
HBS Household Budget Survey 
IWSR International Wines and Spirits Record 
QAIDS Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System 
RTD Ready to Drink 
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Appendix A: Detailed own- and cross price elasticities in the UK 
Table 38: Moderate drinkers: Own- and cross-price elasticities for alcohol beverages 
 
Source: Purshouse et al. (2010b), p.9. 
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Table 39: Hazardous and harmful drinkers: Own- and cross-price elasticities for alcohol beverages 
 
Source: Purshouse et al. (2010b), p.10. 
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Appendix B: Derived Data on Prices: Spain and Poland 
 
Table 40: Prices in Euro per litre, 2015 
  min q05 q25 median q75 q95 max mean sd 
Beer 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.4 0.1 
Wine (still) 1.0 1.4 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.5 3.0 2.0 0.4 
Spirits 7.2 8.6 9.1 9.5 10.2 10.9 11.8 9.6 0.8 
Other wine 2.3 2.7 3.3 3.8 4.6 5.2 7.8 4.0 0.9 
Source: Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2015. 
 
Table 41: Spanish HBS – Prices in Euro per litre by year 
  Beer Wine (still) Spirits Other wine 
2006 1.38 2.01 9.46 4.46 
2007 1.33 1.79 8.95 4.29 
2008 1.36 1.93 10.16 4.28 
2009 1.40 1.89 9.76 4.31 
2010 1.41 1.82 9.16 4.66 
2011 1.34 1.95 8.99 3.63 
2012 1.40 1.94 8.95 3.88 
2013 1.31 2.06 8.97 4.01 
2014 1.36 2.04 9.87 3.79 
2015 1.36 2.17 9.50 3.84 
Source: Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. Remark: Median price over NUTS1 x 
Municipality Size x Year. 
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Table 42: Prices in Złoty per litre, 2016 
  min q05 q25 median q75 q95 max mean sd 
Beer 4.39 4.74 4.94 5.00 5.17 5.29 5.46 5.03 0.17 
Wine (still) 9.49 14.99 17.32 19.05 20.3 22.86 26.65 18.92 2.48 
Spirits 39.98 40.58 42.93 43.98 45.47 47.45 49.98 44.16 1.95 
Other wine 6.76 12.94 16.99 19.99 24.16 31.98 59.98 21.15 6.36 
Source: Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2016 
 
Table 43: Polish HBS – Prices in Złoty per litre by year 
  Beer Wine (still) Spirits Other wine 
2006 4.69 15.55 38.34 11.29 
2007 4.79 16.25     38.83 12.16 
2008 5.00 17.32 39.49 13.00 
2009 5.16 17.95 40.00 13.31 
2010 5.13 18.21 39.99 13.79 
2011 5.13 18.66   39.98 12.84 
2012 5.19    18.53 40.00   12.88 
2013 5.16 18.29 40.00 19.99 
2014 5.05 18.56  42.67 19.99 
2015 5.02 18.9 43.74 20.3 
2016 5.00 19.05 43.98 19.99 
Source: Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. Remark: Median price over NUTS1 x 
Municipality Size x Year. 
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Appendix C: Summary Results on other variables in Two-Stage Regressions 
This appendix summarizes the resulting impacts of the variables used for the first and second stage in 
the Heckman sample selection regressions for Spain. The first stage results model the probability of a 
household consuming a particular alcoholic beverage. At least one of these variables should not be 
included in the second stage regression, which models the amount of consumption. As such variables 
we chose two dummy variables indicating if the household has expenditures in the consumption 
categories pork and games of chance. The underlying intuition is that abstaining from alcohol may be 
due to religious reasons and strongly religious households may also abstain from games of chance and in 
some religious cultures also from eating pork. Besides these two variables we also included a dummy 
variable indicating if the household has expenditures in bars and discotheques. As an approximation to 
the total household income (which is sometimes not reported and thus missing) we include the natural 
logarithm total consumption expenditures. Furthermore, we include some characteristics of the 
household representative such as gender (dummy), unemployed (dummy), age and squared age. The 
latter is included since empirical studies find a U-shaped relationship of alcohol consumption and age, 
with highest likelihood of drinking in middle age segments.  
Table 44: Summary first stage (probability of consumption) results HBS Spain 
  Probability of consuming 
  Beer Wine (still) Spirits Other wines 
Household characteristics 
 
      Expend. on Pork + + + + 
   Expend. on Games of Chance + + + + 
   Expend. on Bar and Disco + + + + 
   Total expenditures + + + + 
Household Representative 
    
   Female - - - - 
   Unemployed + + (+) - 
   Age + + + + 
   Age² - - - - 
Source: Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. 
Table 44 summarizes the results of the first stage regressions. The signs indicate the direction of the 
effect of the regressions by household size. The parentheses around a sign indicate that the relationship 
is not robust throughout the different household sizes and blanks indicate insignificant coefficients. 
According to prior expectations, households with expenditures on pork and games of chance show a 
higher probability of consuming alcoholic beverages. Furthermore, household that spend money in bars 
and discotheques show a higher probability of alcohol consumption. The likelihood of consuming 
alcohol also increases with total consumption expenditures, indicating an income effect on the 
likelihood of alcohol consumption. Turning to the characteristics of the household representative, 
household with a female representative tend to be less likely to consume alcoholic beverages, whereas 
an unemployed household head increases the likelihood of consuming beer or wine. The age profile is 
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also in line with the results of other empirical studies, indicating that the probability of consuming 
alcohol increases with age until it reaches a peak and then declines. Using the specific elasticities of beer 
for single households, for example, the peak probability of consuming beer would be at around age 48. 
The peak for single households spirits consumption probability is at 55 and the curve for wine is much 
flatter with a peak at 70. 
Table 45 summarizes the impact of the second stage variables, besides the ones already presented in 
the tables in the main chapter. In addition to the variables used in first stage (except for the excluded 
variables pork and game of chance), we introduced dummies for the income quartile groups and a 
dummy that is 1 if the household representative holds a university degree. Overall, the amount 
consumed increases with total consumption expenditures. Conditional on that, the amount consumed 
decreases monotonically (except for other wines, which is due to insignificant coefficients) with income 
quartile. Households with consumption spending on bars and discotheques spend less on other wines. 
Being married, female, a smoker or having children reduces the consumption relative to the baseline 
categories unmarried, male, non-smoking and no children. Household heads with a university degree 
consume less be and more wine. Age has a similar shaped effect on consumed quantity as on probability 
of consumption. The quantity peaks for all households (up to 5 adults) are at 46 for beer, 74 for wine, 
and 51 for spirits.  
Table 45: Summary second stage (amount consumed) results HBS Spain 
  Beer Wine (still) Spirits Other wines 
Household characteristics 
    
   Total expend. + + + + 
   Expend. on Bar and Disco 
   
- 
HH income relative to q1 
       q2 less than q1 less than q1 less than q1 less than q1 
   q3 less than q2 less than q2 less than q2 
    q4 less than q3 less than q3 less than q3 less than q2 
Household Representative 
       Married - - - - 
   Female - - - - 
   Smoker - - - - 
   Children - - - - 
   University degree - + 
     Unemployed + 
  
- 
   Age + + + + 
   Age² - - - - 
Source: Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. 
Table 46 and Table 47 show the results for the respective regressions for Poland. Variables with no 
significant robust pattern over different household sizes are excluded. Regarding the first stage, 
expenditures on pork do not seem to be positively correlated with the decision to buy wine. Having 
expenditures on bars reduces the probability of purchasing other wines. Having a female head of 
household reduces the probability of consuming beer and spirits but increases the probability of 
purchasing still wine.  
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Table 46: Summary first stage (probability of consumption) results HBS Poland 
  Probability of consuming 
  Beer Wine (still) Spirits Other wines 
Household 
 
      Expend. on Pork + (-) + + 
   Expend. on Games of Chance + + + + 
   Expend. on Bar and Disco + + + - 
   Total expenditures + + + + 
Head of Household 
    
   Female - + - 
 
   Unemployed - - - 
 
   Age 
  
+ + 
   Age² 
  
- - 
Source: Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. 
Total consumption expenditures exert a highly significant positive effect on the amount consumed in 
single and one adult households. Coefficients on income quartiles were very unstable across samples 
with different household sizes, so no clear statements can be made to that regard. Households with 
married reference person purchase less beer, still wine and spirits, with the exception of one adult and 
single households, whose reference person consumes more spirits. Households with female reference 
persons consume less alcohol on average, with the exception of other wines. Having a university degree 
reduces average consumption of beer but increases consumption of wine.  
Table 47: Summary second stage (amount consumed) results HBS Poland 
  Amount consumed 
  Beer Wine (still) Spirits Other wines 
Household 
    
   Total expend. + for single/one adult 
   Head of Household 
    
   Married - - 
- / +  for single 
and one adult  
   Female - - - + 
   Children - - - - 
   University degree - + 
     Unemployed + + 
 
 
   Age + + 
  
   Age² - -     
Source: Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. 
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Appendix D: Results for Price Elasticities of Soft Drinks 
Table 48: Spanish Soft Drinks Price elasticities by Household Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All up to 3 Adults up to 2 Adults one Adult Single HH 
      
Beer cross-price -0.330 -0.299 -0.198 -0.0978 -0.0880 
 (0.0433)*** (0.0464)*** (0.0535)*** (0.125) (0.136) 
      
Wine (still) cross-price -0.0603 -0.0659 -0.0828 -0.0252 -0.00521 
 (0.0184)** (0.0196)*** (0.0227)*** (0.0537) (0.0585) 
      
Other wine cross-price -0.0463 -0.0289 -0.0153 0.0444 0.0573 
 (0.0136)*** (0.0146)* (0.0168) (0.0390) (0.0425) 
      
Spirit cross-price 0.0716 0.0488 -0.00372 -0.182 -0.219 
 (0.0276)** (0.0296) (0.0341) (0.0808)* (0.0886)* 
      
Soft Drinks own-price -0.557 -0.607 -0.643 -0.410 -0.375 
 (0.0487)*** (0.0520)*** (0.0599)*** (0.138)** (0.152)* 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 184,149 164,872 127,989 29,425 26,002 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 134,342 117,519 87,355 16,264 13,792 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in liter per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. 
  
 
88 – IHS – Price elasticity and implied tax revenue effects for alcoholic beverages 
 
 
Table 49: Spanish Soft Drinks Price elasticities by drinking behavior and income group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Light Medium Heavy IncQ1 IncQ2 IncQ3 IncQ4 
        
Beer cross-price -0.293 -0.0630 -0.744 -0.107 -0.299 -0.450 -0.538 
 (0.0460)*** (0.149) (0.220)*** (0.0858) (0.0837)*** (0.0854)*** (0.0924)*** 
        
Wine (still) cross-price -0.0561 0.0480 -0.322 -0.0659 -0.0256 -0.0197 -0.150 
 (0.0195)** (0.0613) (0.0935)*** (0.0363) (0.0355) (0.0368) (0.0386)*** 
        
Other wine cross-price -0.0509 -0.0137 0.00448 0.0253 -0.0384 -0.122 -0.0556 
 (0.0145)*** (0.0456) (0.0694) (0.0276) (0.0268) (0.0272)*** (0.0274)* 
        
Spirit cross-price 0.0753 0.152 -0.00897 -0.0349 0.0466 0.0827 0.219 
 (0.0293)* (0.0943) (0.140) (0.0572) (0.0546) (0.0543) (0.0552)*** 
        
Soft Drinks own-price -0.577 -0.994 0.226 -0.564 -0.519 -0.690 -0.461 
 (0.0517)*** (0.165)*** (0.247) (0.0982)*** (0.0951)*** (0.0967)*** (0.0997)*** 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 162,924 14,568 6,657 46,297 46,155 45,917 45,780 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 118,400 11,026 4,916 30,942 33,653 34,663 35,084 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in liter per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Spanish HBS 2006-2015. 
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Table 50: Polish Soft Drinks Price elasticities by Household Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All up to 3 Adults up to 2 Adults one Adult Single HH 
      
Beer cross-price 0.826 0.845 0.852 0.621 0.656 
 (0.0486)*** (0.0517)*** (0.0583)*** (0.133)*** (0.166)*** 
      
Wine (still) cross-price -0.00164 0.00299 -0.00374 -0.0370 -0.0322 
 (0.0138) (0.0147) (0.0166) (0.0381) (0.0474) 
      
Other wine cross-price 0.0602 0.0567 0.0542 0.0266 0.0242 
 (0.00489)*** (0.00521)*** (0.00589)*** (0.0134)* (0.0166) 
      
Spirit cross-price 0.332 0.285 0.237 0.153 0.199 
 (0.0352)*** (0.0373)*** (0.0419)*** (0.0956) (0.119) 
      
Soft drink own-price -0.434 -0.460 -0.481 -0.523 -0.553 
 (0.0151)*** (0.0161)*** (0.0182)*** (0.0423)*** (0.0527)*** 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 296,286 262,028 205,487 51,183 45,355 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 252,719 221,857 171,899 39,644 34,190 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 5% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in liter per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. 
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Table 51: Polish Soft Drinks Price elasticities by drinking behaviour and income group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Light Medium Heavy IncQ1 IncQ2 IncQ3 IncQ4 
        
Beer cross-price 1.005 1.297 0.892 0.882 0.846 1.051 0.969 
 (0.0545)*** (0.304)*** (0.683) (0.112)*** (0.106)*** (0.105)*** (0.106)*** 
        
Wine (still) cross-price 0.0219 -0.311 -0.0948 0.0937 0.0640 -0.0478 -0.105 
 (0.0155) (0.0842)*** (0.195) (0.0316)** (0.0301)* (0.0298) (0.0300)*** 
        
Other wine cross-price 0.0791 0.0428 0.0394 0.0643 0.104 0.0918 0.0443 
 (0.00547)*** (0.0304) (0.0742) (0.0113)*** (0.0108)*** (0.0104)*** (0.0105)*** 
        
Spirit cross-price 0.445 0.462 0.520 0.509 0.485 0.510 0.174 
 (0.0394)*** (0.210)* (0.475) (0.0834)*** (0.0783)*** (0.0750)*** (0.0742)* 
        
Soft Drinks own-price -0.586 -0.551 -0.618 -0.706 -0.605 -0.537 -0.407 
 (0.0169)*** (0.0961)*** (0.218)** (0.0341)*** (0.0325)*** (0.0322)*** (0.0339)*** 
Observations (1
st
 stage) 304,165 9,274 1,993 66,113 78,753 83,628 86,938 
Observations (2
nd
 stage) 262,208 8,011 1,646 54,424 67,075 72,914 77,452 
Remarks: Standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Only Households with up to 5 members aged 18 and above are included. The observations 
with the top and bottom 1% of consumed quantities per adult have been removed to correct for outliers. Estimation is carried out via two-step Heckman selection 
model, with selected second stage results being reported in the table. The dependent variable is quantity in liter per legal-drinking age adult (aged 18 or above). Source: 
Own calculations based on Polish HBS 2006-2016. 
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